Abstract
Turkey and the European Union (EU)
share the same neighborhood in the Mediterranean, Middle
East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus regions, with the same
objectives of creating a ring of friends, minimizing threats
to their social, political, economic, and energy interests,
and ensuring stability. This paper aims to explain the
relations of Turkey and the EU with the shared neighborhood
countries; to analyze the compatibility of Turkish and EU
neighborhood policies; and to demonstrate the need for these
two actors to work together in order to achieve credible
results in their neighborhood policies. I argue that
coordinated Turkish and EU neighborhood policies may bring
better results than individualistic approaches, bringing the
credibility that the EU needs the most in these regions as
well as opening channels of communication in a constructive
manner. This relationship is believed to be mutually
beneficial as long as Turkey and the EU both maximize their
capabilities in these regions.
Keywords: European Neighborhood
Policy, Turkey, shared neighborhood, the Mediterranean,
Middle East, the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions, Russia.
Introduction
The EU aims to encourage regional
cooperation, promote human rights, democracy, and good
governance, prevent conflicts, and fight against
international crime in its neighborhood. With these
objectives the EU has been formulating new policies since
the mid-1990s dealing with its neighbors in the southern
Mediterranean and northern borders. As enlargement
continued, the number of these policies and the regions the
EU concentrated on increased, i.e. the Black Sea. Especially
with the 2004 enlargement, the EU was hard-pressed to
formulate an overhauling policy on its neighborhood to
deeper relations with all the neighbors and develop
tailor-made relations with each country.
In 2003 the EU initiated the neighborhood
policy (ENP) by publishing the Commission Communication
Paper on Wider Europe and, in 2004, its first Strategy Paper
on the European Neighborhood Policy. In the Communication
Paper the objective of the EU has been framed as promoting
“the regional and subregional cooperation and integration
that are preconditions for political stability, economic
development and the reduction of poverty and social
divisions”.
In 2004, the Strategy Paper presented the vision of the ENP
as involving “a ring of countries, sharing the EU's
fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an
increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation
to involve a significant measure of economic and political
integration.”
The
ENP covers all the non-EU participants in the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (with the exception of
Turkey), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and
Georgia. Under the ENP, the European Commission (hereinafter
referred to as “the Commission”) prepared country reports
for all of the countries involved in the ENP, and then the
ENP Action Plans were developed which define short- and
medium-term (3–5 years) priorities. All the reforms that are
advised by the Commission are supported through EC-funded
financial and technical assistance.
In 2006, the Commission published a new
paper focusing on the weaknesses of the policy, economic and
trade relations, migration, people-to-people contacts,
financial, political, and regional cooperation, while
building a thematic dimension to the ENP.
A year later, the Commission started to work on new
strategies on the eastern neighbors and the Black Sea
countries. Two main papers came out: the Black Sea Synergy
Paper and the Eastern Partnership. The Black Sea Synergy
expressed the need for regional cooperation in the Black Sea
region, to achieve increased stability and prosperity. The
EU’s 2007 Black Sea Synergy was very broad, both in terms of
the content and the geographical space it covers, which made
it very difficult to implement. At this point, the EU
started to search for new ways to work with the region, and
thus the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched in 2008.
Although the EaP is concerned with the same region as the
Black Sea Synergy, the EaP is a more concentrated and
compact initiative than the Black Sea Synergy, and is a more
ambitious partnership which aims to emphasize the need for a
differentiated approach.
The EaP proposed new measures regarding integration into the
EU economy, energy security, economic and social
development, and mobility.
Although the intentions of the proposed partnership were
accepted by the EU, the regional countries
which have been left out of the EaP, such as Russia and
Turkey, expressed their objections. It has been the general
belief that the policies which will be effective and
successful should include Russia and Turkey in the region.
The EaP, as part of the ENP, could not include Turkey
structurally, since it is a candidate country; however,
Turkey criticized the policy and asked the Union to include
Turkey and Russia, not as neighbors but as partners.
The ENP is designed to tie the
neighboring countries to the EU without promising EU
membership. Therefore Turkey, as a candidate country aiming
to be a full member of the Union, is not eligible to take
part in the ENP. However, Turkey and Russia have been the
main littoral states which have shaped Black Sea politics
historically. These two countries thus wish to continue with
their strategic roles in the region, while Turkey also wants
to be an EU member. But defining Turkey as a neighbor and
including it in the ENP would jeopardize Turkey’s candidacy.
Within this framework, both Russia and Turkey requested to
be included in the EaP as partners, to be able to influence
EU policy towards the region while stressing their special
positions in the region.
Turkey and the EU, since they share
borders, find themselves in disagreement over their specific
policies towards the countries in the Mediterranean, the
Middle East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. This paper has
three main objectives in this framework; to explain the
relations of Turkey and the EU with the shared neighborhood
countries in the regions mentioned above; to analyze the
compatibility of Turkish and EU neighborhood policies; and
demonstrate the need for these two actors to work together
in order to achieve credible results in their neighborhood
policies. It is argued that due to the candidacy status of
Turkey the EU is a determining element in Turkish foreign
policy-making, while Turkey itself is a crucial element in
the EU’s neighborhood due to the cultural, political,
economic, and commercial ties of Turkey to the regional
countries in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Black
Sea, and the Caucasus.
The Mediterranean and the Middle East
Turkey has been prioritizing its
relations with the Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern
countries in the last decade while trying to solve its
problems with its Middle Eastern neighbors and increase
relations with southern Mediterranean countries such as
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. In particular, relations
with Syria were developed in the 2000s. In the 1990s, water
and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) were the main
problems between the two countries. The cause of
disagreement between Syria and Turkey was the Euphrates and
Tigris rivers. Those two rivers originate within Turkish
borders, but they flow down to Syria and Iraq. Thus, these
two rivers are the most important water resources for all
three countries. When Turkey wanted to build the Southeast
Anatolian Project (SAP) on the Euphrates, it became a
problem with Syria. The demands of Syria were that the
Euphrates and Tigris rivers should be recognized as
international waters and the level of water being given by
Turkey to Syria should be increased. Thus, Syria sought to
discuss this issue under the UN framework; however, due to
Turkey’s objections this issue was not debated under the UN
umbrella.
However, as long as Abdullah Öcalan,
leader of PKK, resided in Damascus,
and the terrorist activities of the PKK continued to find
support in Syria, the water problem was not solved between
these two countries.
A new era in relations between Turkey and Syria was
initiated and negotiations on water started only after
Öcalan’s expulsion from Damascus in 1999. In 2007 the two
countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding for
Cooperation between Turkey and Syria concerning politics
and security, economy, and energy and water and deepening of
the cooperation between the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO)
and the Syrian Oil Company and progress in visits and
opinion exchange in the field of water were agreed. In
addition, Turkey designed a “Three-Staged Plan” based on the
fact that the Euphrates and the Tigris make up a single
transboundary river system. The Plan envisaged the
preparation of common inventories of water and land
resources for a final allocation of water between the
riparian states. Finally, in 2009, Turkey and Syria signed
an agreement on lifting the visa between the two countries
and also signed a bilateral cooperation accord under which
top ministers from the two countries would meet each year.
Therefore, it can be argued that the end of the terrorist
threat and the increase in economic and trade links at the
border helped to create good-neighborly relations, which
improved the prospects for cultural, social and political
relations as well.
Over the last decade Turkey has been
trying to improve its relations with its southern neighbors.
In the 1980s and the 1990s the Middle Eastern neighbors were
perceived as the troubled areas and Turkey tried to refrain
itself from being engaged in the conflicts in the region.
However in the 2000s through its cultural, economic and
trade links Turkey has been working hard to create a
friendly environment in the region. Within the same
framework, Turkey increased its economic and cultural
relations with the southern Mediterranean countries, which
led to agreements on ending the visa requirements with
Libya, Jordan, and Tunisia as well. Moreover, Turkey and
Iran have a visa agreement which allows their citizens to
travel freely between the two countries. Therefore, Turkey
can be seen as a hub country in a region that the EU is also
trying to promote regional cooperation and free trade area.
Since the mid-1990s the EU has been
working to establish a credible policy towards the
Mediterranean region and trying to play an active role in
efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
contributing to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) as a
member of the so-called Middle East Quartet (the US, the EU,
Russia and the UN). It is argued that it is in the EU’s
self-interest to invest in stability and cooperation around
its neighborhood,
and especially in the Mediterranean region due to its
strategically essential position. Within this framework, in
1995 the EU initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP), better known as the Barcelona Process, with its
Mediterranean neighbors. This new partnership’s main aim was
to create the means for dialogue, cooperation, peace, and
stability between the EU and its southern Mediterranean
countries while strengthening north-south relations and
“south-south” interaction.
However, after the Barcelona Process was initiated, the end
of the 1990s saw an increase in conflicting relations
throughout the Mediterranean region, while fault lines along
a north-south and south-south axis have become more
apparent,
developments in North Africa and the Middle East to which
the EU has failed to react. Since then the EU has been
attempting to inject dynamism into the Barcelona Process. As
the EU enlarged, though, it needed a new policy to export
stability and welfare to neighboring countries. In 2004 the
EU launched the ENP, which aimed and increase the
possibilities of cooperation in political and economic
spheres, taking on the model of the accession process in
order to offer its neighbors a deeper involvement in EU
policies.
Even though the ENP does not promise EU membership to the
partner countries, it offered “everything but the
institutions”.
However, it has been noted that the
inadequacy in the financial disbursement,
asymmetrical trade liberalization, collapse of the MEPP,
inadequate encouragement for political reforms, ambiguity of
the action plans, and limited funding allocated for
promotion of human rights
prevented the successful implementation of the policies
towards the Mediterranean region. In 2007 a new policy under
the name of the Mediterranean Union was introduced by French
President Nicolas Sarkozy, which was criticized heavily by
Turkey since it has been presented as an alternative to
Turkey’s potential EU membership. The other member-states’
criticisms centered on the risk of reducing the
effectiveness of the already established neighborhood
policies in the Mediterranean region. Furthermore, the other
actors such as the civil society organizations both in the
EU member-states and southern Mediterranean countries which
are involved in the Mediterranean policies of the EU for
over a decade were drawing attention to the possibility of
duplication of policies and initiatives
while undermining the work of Barcelona Process.
As a result of the criticisms the Mediterranean Union has
gone through modifications and launched under the Barcelona
Process as Union for the Mediterranean. Turkey has
participated in this process and emphasized its improved
relations with the Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern
countries and its importance as an asset in the development
of the ENP and creation of ring of friends in the region.
Within this framework, Turkey also
emphasized its role in the Middle East and the resolution of
conflict between Israel and Palestine. In relations with
Israel, Turkey’s main concern has been the Palestinian
Authority (PA) and the peace
process. In the 1980s and 1990s , Turkey tried to stay out
of the conflict between Israel and PA as much as possible.
However, after Turkey’s candidacy to the EU was announced,
and after the accession negotiations started, Turkey started
to perceive the Palestine question as an area of
responsibility and opportunity to play a constructive role
in the region.
However, in the last decade it is clear that Turkey’s
foreign policy has moved more towards Palestine and some
disputes with Israel have been observed in the political
arena. But one should observe that although the political
and diplomatic problems occupied the agenda the economic and
trade relations as well as the military and security
relations continued during the Turkey-Israel diplomatic
struggles. In 2009 the extent of bilateral trade between
Israel and Turkey was $2.5 billion
and Turkey is listed as one of the main trading partners of
Israel both in imports and exports.
Certainly, problems with some of the
neighbors continue in the region, i.e. Iraq. Both in the
Gulf and the Iraq Wars, Turkey has been determined that the
military intervention in the region would disturb the
balance of power in Iraq, and ethnic conflicts would
increase the instability in the whole Middle East.
Especially the Kurdish separatist groups in Northern Iraq
worried Turkey, and territorial integrity has been the main
priority of the Turkish government during and after the Iraq
War. The possibility of the disintegration of Iraq and the
formation of an independent Kurdish state is perceived as
one of the biggest security threats by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Armed Forces in the region
towards Turkey.
Still, this possibility shapes the relations between Iraq
and Turkey as well as the USA. Turkey as a neighboring and a
regional country, opposes to the idea of a federal system in
Iraq, which may encourage the other Kurdish groups in the
region for more autonomy. Within this framework, Turkey
emphasizes the importance of territorial and political
integrity of Iraq in negotiations with Iraq and the USA.
During the 2000s Turkey has shown an
increasing ability to use its soft power while emphasizing
the necessity of political and economic reform in the
Islamic world, and the promotion of harmony between
different cultures and civilizations. Turkey’s approach to
the Mediterranean and the Middle East demonstrated some
resemblance to EU’s policies in pursuing a resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict; promoting political and
economic reform in the region; working toward peaceful
stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq; and finding a
diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis.
In this context, Turkey as a regional country which has
close cultural ties with the societies in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East is eager to work towards the main goals
of the ENP, such as decreasing socio-economic problems,
increasing regional cooperation in economic, social, and
political spheres, and bringing stability to the region.
The Black Sea and the Caucasus
The Black Sea and the Caucasus were
inaccessible to Turkey during the Cold War era. It was only
possible for Turkey to establish relations with the
countries in the region after the end of the Cold War. After
the end of the Cold War, Turkey felt confused in its foreign
affairs and initially, she tried to take the opportunity to
establish relations with the Turkic-speaking nations in the
region, in the Caucasus and the Central Asia such as
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan, with which Turkey also has cultural,
religious, and ethnic ties.
Turkey’s main aim has been positioning itself in the centre
of regional cooperation in the Black Sea region connecting
the Middle East, Caucasus, the Balkans and Europe.
In the 1990s Turkey’s main aim was to create a zone of
influence to lead the regional countries while increasing
the EU’s relations with those countries and increase her
influence in the region and beyond.
Nevertheless, the international situation
in the 1990s was not suitable for Turkey’s aims in the
region, which are characterized by a) the ethnic separatist
movements by Chechens and Kurds, b) possible NATO bases in
Georgia and Azerbaijan, c) change in the naval balance in
the Black Sea, d) Russia’s peacekeeper role in the CIS, e)
natural gas and oil pipelines, and f) regime regarding the
Straits created a mutual mistrust towards each other.
In the 2000s the relations in the region,
especially with Russia, were improved, and the EU’s
increased attention to the region created better
opportunities for cooperation for Turkey in the Black Sea
and the Caucasus. In the Black Sea region the EU emphasizes
gas and oil projects, electricity network interconnections,
the Black Sea Ring Corridor, the Black Sea Pan European
Transport Area,
TRACECA,
linking Central Asia and the Caucasus, and projects on
environmental protection. The Bucharest Convention and Black
Sea Environmental Program attracted attention, leading to a
Communication published by the Commission on the environment
in the Danube and Black Sea Region.
In addition to energy, environment, and transport, the
region is crucial to the EU’s efforts in combating organized
crime, illegal trafficking in drugs, people, and arms,
corruption, and money laundering. Therefore, the EU’s main
interests in the region can be categorized as energy
security, environmental issues, frozen conflicts, and
cooperative measures in combating new security threats,
including human security.
Among all the EU-initiated projects,
Turkey has been primarily interested in TRACECA and became a
part of the program in 2002. Turkey places special emphasis
on this program with a view to increasing its share and role
in regional transport while decreasing the traffic at the
Bosporus and Dardanelles.
Turkey believes that among all the projects and programs,
the TRACECA is the most effectual one for Turkey to increase
foreign direct investment, tourism, regional development,
hard-currency income, and employment.
In addition, Turkey is a part of the Black Sea Cross Border
initiative and some cities at the Black Sea coast, i.e.
Istanbul, Tekirdağ, Kocaeli, Zonguldak, Kastamonu, Samsun
and Trabzon, are covered by the Black Sea Basin Program.
Within this framework, Turkey placed
special importance on furthering cooperation in the Black
Sea region while emphasizing the value of rule of law,
democratic transition, and respect for human rights, and
establishing closer relations with the West, especially the
EU.
Turkey focused on energy agreements with the regional
countries one of which has been the construction of
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. Although Russia has
objected to this pipeline due to the fact that it helps the
regional countries to bypass Russia in their energy
policies, Turkey insisted on this pipeline, believing that
it would push Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey towards
stabler relations in the long run.
Turkey’s position on the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been rather different than
its balanced position towards Georgia. Although Turkey
supports the importance of an international response to the
conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, it has been in close
relations with Azerbaijan, which prevented its ability to
act as a mediator in the OSCE Minsk Group, even though it
wanted to in the early 1990s. Especially after the embargo
on Armenia and the suspension of diplomatic relations with
Armenia, Turkey became an actor rather than a mediator in
this conflict.
In the 1990s Turkey perceived Armenian-Greek rapprochement
as a threat to its security concerns.
However, in 2000 Turkey and Armenia took some steps towards
normalizing relations, such as the establishment of the
Turkish-Armenian Peace Commission. After the 2008 August war
in Georgia, Turkey took further steps towards establishing a
platform for the regional countries under the auspices of
the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform to create
positive relations between Armenia, Turkey, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Russia. It is argued that the normalization
of relations between Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and the
resolution of the existing conflicts will bring economic
prosperity to the region and increase the export-import
capabilities of these three countries, fostering trade in
some important commodities, such as the export of gas from
Azerbaijan to Armenia and of electricity from Armenia to
Turkey.
In the south Caucasus, Turkey aims to
increase its economic and trade links, become a leading
regional actor, and make itself invaluable to the EU in its
relations with the Black Sea regional states. However,
although the end of the Cold War brought new opportunities,
opened new markets and created new allies, the region also
means new risks, new conflict areas and new problems.
Therefore, Turkey is making an effort to act together with
the EU and spread the EU’s policies and models of
cooperation regarding economic, cultural, and social
policies.
Russia
Russia is an important neighbor for
Turkey and the EU, although it is not included in the ENP.
Turkey’s relations with Russia have increased, especially
during the 1980s due to the Turkish enterprises’ efforts to
find an alternative to the western markets. In the 1990s,
political relations with Russia have suffered due to
Turkey’s efforts to reconnect with the other Black Sea and
the Caucasus countries. Russia perceived this as a threat to
its own sphere of influence. The agreement on the BTC
pipeline also had some negative effects on the relations
such as political tension between Turkey and Russia.
However, trade and economic links between Russia and Turkey
continued to increase during the 1990s and continued into
the 2000s. In 1997, exports to Russia totaled nearly 2.1
billion USD, and in 2009 this value increased to 3.2
billion. This growing trend is evident in imports as well:
in 1997 imports were almost 2.2 billion USD and increased to
19.4 billion in 2009.
In the 1990s Russia stated that it is one
of the biggest powers in the world and needs to protect its
interests in its neighborhood while at the same time
strengthening its ties to the East and the West.
In this context, energy relations between Russia and the
neighboring regions stood out. The energy trade between
Russia and Turkey started in the 1980s and, in line with the
EU’s policies on securing energy flow from energy producing
countries to energy consuming countries, continued to grow,
including natural gas, LNG (liquefied natural gas), and
petrol. The economic reconciliation and the increase in
energy relations between Turkey and Russia helped these two
countries to overcome the disagreements on Armenia, Kurdish
and Chechen separatist groups, disputes over Turkish
Straits. In 2010 the relations were furthered and in order
to facilitate trade the visas have been lifted between
Russian Federation and Turkish Republic.
The EU places special importance on its
relations with Russia, since it is the EU’s third biggest
trading partner, with Russian supplies of oil and gas making
up a large percentage of Russia’s exports to Europe. EU
bases its cooperation with Russia on four main areas
economic issues and the environment; Freedom, Security and
Justice; External Security; and Research and Education under
the “Common Spaces” title.
Relations between the EU and Russia affect the whole of
Eastern Europe and the Black Sea regions, as well as the
Caucasus. The EU and Russia established institutional joint
structures, bilateral agreements, strategies, and policies.
However EU could not still create a common policy towards
Russia which allows the individual member-states to pursue
their own independent policies towards Russia. Therefore,
reconciliation between the EU and Russia could not be
achieved yet which prevents free trade area to be
established. Moreover, energy issues are still debated and
EU could not agree on the reciprocity clause regarding the
energy charter.
Energy is the main issue between the EU and Russia, since 50
per cent of the EU’s energy is imported from Russia and 75
per cent of Russia’s export revenue depends directly on the
single European energy market. This interdependence assumed
to create a partnership however, the mistrust towards Russia
especially among the eastern bloc in the EU, issues rising
due to the problems in implementation of human rights,
democratic governance and rule of law in Russia prevents the
EU to identify Russia as a partner and sign credible
bilateral agreements.
Regarding its role in EU-Russia
relations, Turkey puts its efforts to be the regional
mediator power similar to the other regions, the
Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Black Sea, and the
Caucasus. In particular, Turkey is trying to take part in
the energy relations between Europe and Russia, emphasizing
its stable economic, commercial, political, and energy
relations with Russia, and suggests that it would serve as a
perfect hub by bypassing the eastern bloc countries which
have difficult relations with Russia.
Conclusion
Both Turkey and the EU are aiming to have
a “ring of friends” in their shared neighborhood so as to
minimize the threats to social, political, economic, and
energy interests, while ensuring stability factors in the
Mediterranean, Middle East, Black Sea, and the Caucasus
regions. It is argued here that in order to achieve their
mutual objectives in the neighboring regions, there is a
need for coordination between Turkey and the EU.
Turkey has been trying to encourage
regional cooperation in its region since the end of the Cold
War. However, due to the international and domestic
adversities it had been difficult for Turkey to be engaged
in intense relations with its neighbors. In the 2000s it has
been more feasible for Turkey to increase political and
economic relations with regional countries such as Syria,
Egypt, Lebanon, Georgia, and Russia. This has been possible,
first, due to the changes in the international agenda;
second, due to the involvement of the EU in these regions
through the ENP; and, third, due to Turkey’s EU candidacy,
which created opportunities for Turkey in the regions where
the ENP has been initiated.
Within this framework, Turkey as an EU
candidate wants to use its geostrategic location. Turkey
presents its cultural ties, economic and trade relations,
and the potential to be the EU’s energy hub as important
assets to the ENP. In parallel, Turkish Elite Survey
conducted in 2009 under the Strenthening and Integrating
Academic Networks (SInAN) project, demonstrated that Turkish
MPs
emphasize the importance of Turkey and believe that Turkey
should intensify relations with the Mediterranean, Middle
East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus without any
differentiation in order to increase its role as economic,
energy and trade hub in the region.
Source: Sait Aksit, Özgehan
Şenyuva, and Çiğdem Üstün, MYTHS AND ELITES, Turkish Elite
Survey 2009: Initial Findings, Centre for European
Studies-Middle East Technical University: Ankara, 2009
The research showed that the policy
makers in the TGNA believe in the necessity of
multi-regional approach in conducting Turkish foreign
policy. The general understanding is that Turkey should
continue furthering its relations with the neighboring
countries that Turkey as a strong regional mediating power
would be an important asset for the Union to achieve its aim
of creating a ‘ring of friends’ in its neighborhood. In this
perspective I argue that Turkish and EU’s shared
neighborhood policies may bring better results than the
individualistic approaches in these regions. However, this
can be achieved only if Turkey sees a credible potential for
itself to be a full member of the Union. The prolongation of
Turkey’s accession to the EU would decrease the enthusiasm
of Turkey to align with the EU and its neighborhood
policies, which may jeopardize the benefits that EU can get
in its neighborhood through Turkey’s cultural, political,
social, economic and trade links with Turkey’s neighbors.
Turkish and EU close relationship in the neighborhood
policies would bring the credibility that the EU needs the
most in these regions, while opening the communication
channels in a constructive manner. This relationship is
believed to be mutually beneficial as long as both Turkey
and the EU make the maximum of their potentials in these
regions.
(pp. 342-353)