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Thieves of the Law and the
Rule of Law in
Georgia
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Virginia Davis Nordin is an attorney at law and professor of
Higher Education Policy Studies, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, KY.
Georgi Glonti is a professor of criminology and Dean of
Law at the Georgia University of Social Sciences. He has had
two Fulbrights in the U.S. to teach and study criminology. |
Abstract
This article combines research on the
Thieves of the Law in Georgia by a Georgian criminologist with
the search for the real meeting of the Rule of Law in this
former soviet country by an American lawyer. The first section
of the paper cites some of the contradictory descriptions of the
Thieves of the Law in the USSR and Georgia with a brief look at
the functions of customary commercial law in emerging societies
and concludes that the story of the Thieves of the Law is vital
to understand the nature of Georgian society and the
possibilities of establishing the Rule of Law in that Country.
The next section illustrates the importance of and the
continuing impact of the Thieves Law in national and
international economic activities. A final conclusion stresses
that defining law, crime and society is complex and that a
knowledge of the particular stories of each is a necessary first
step.
Keywords:
Georgia, thieves in law, rule of law reform, crime, thieves
code, traditions
Introduction
The establishment of the Rule of Law is
important in all former Soviet states for social, political and
economic growth. However, this establishment is not going as
well as might be hoped. We believe that one reason for this is
a failure to relate Rule of Law reform efforts to existing legal
norms. The presentation of material on the Thieves of the Law
in Georgia is intended to help reformers understand the current
and historic legal context in Georgia. Although all Georgians
are aware of the Thieves organization in Georgia, most
foreigners have not been. But, when a university professor
tells a Westerner that he might ignore laws passed by
Parliament, but he would never ignore a Thieves’ law, that law
becomes interesting.
The interaction between Georgians and
Americans regarding the Rule of Law is especially interesting
because they are such opposite ends of the pole. Americans have
a religious reverence for the Rule of Law, its procedures and
manifestations, especially their Constitution. Georgians, on
the other hand, automatically resist law in any and all forms
because for most of their history “the law” has not been
Georgian law but that of an overlord or conqueror. Although the
Americans are not conquerors or colonizers, many Georgians tend
to regard them as the current overlords. Georgians are happy to
pass most suggested law reforms, possibly because they don’t
have much intention to pay attention to them once they are
passed. Perhaps understanding more about the legal context and
history of Georgia would help make reform laws more effective.
Understanding the Thieves of the Law is one
part of this effort. From one standpoint the Thieves, under the
tutelage of the Soviet prison camp authorities learned to extend
their historic guild or brotherhood into a more effective
administrative structure and learned to extend that structure
geographically throughout the Soviet prison camps in all of the
USSR. Thus, an extended international criminal-economic
organization is one more thing we have to thank the Soviets
for. From another point of view, on a local basis the Thieves
supplied local stability and support during the Soviet era. As
the separate culture Caroline Humphrey refers to, they had an
excellent welfare and tax systems and, of course, police force.
They allowed the development of the shadow economy that
sustained and enriched the country during difficult times.
As a political and economic force they have
played and still play an important role. The interaction
between Georgian clans and the Thieves is yet to be fully
described, and their role in ordinary life in Soviet times when
every neighborhood had its Thief also needs to be understood
more thoroughly. It is hoped that this effort and the
forthcoming American edition of the Glonti material will be a
useful step toward an understanding that will underpin an
effective effort to establish the Rule of Law.
The American
Perspective: The Rule of Law in Georgia
I first went to Georgia as a Fulbright
professor in the spring of 2000 because I thought the West,
specifically the US, was not doing enough to help the former
USSR learn democracy and the market economy. It seemed to me
that the Soviets had never known much about either historically
and they certainly hadn’t been free to study our way of doing
things from behind the iron curtain. Given this total lack of
familiarity or understanding of our complex system, worked out
by us over hundreds of years, it appeared to me that the West
was not adequately preparing Russia and the Newly Independent
States (NIS) to function in their new free world. If anything
the West was trying to teach these venerable societies about the
free market and democracy and the Rule of Law about the same way
someone might teach a child to swim by throwing him off the end
of a dock. I thought I could at least put my little drop in the
bucket by teaching American law in some area.
By my good fortune and Providence I wound
up in Georgia. Georgian society was a revelation to me. I
became slowly convinced that very little progress toward
democracy, civil society and the free market economy was being
made because the Western, more precisely American, culture and
the Georgian culture did not understand each other. We Americans
had all the good will, good intentions and technical expertise
in the world, but good intentions do not necessarily result in
good programs or progress. Nor was there much of a clear
concept that the Georgians have an extensive, intricate,
sophisticated society and culture that has survived for
centuries, not necessarily with any of the basic assumptions
Americans make about the innate nature of man which includes a
reverence for a written Constitution, a devotion to due process
and a number of similar concepts which constitute the American
civil religion. Assuming that American laws and market rules
could be grafted onto Georgian society was like trying to graft
an artichoke onto an orange tree. The reforms wither and die.
The Georgians politely do what the Americans and other Western
reformers ask by way of passing laws, adopting constitutions,
changing police procedure, customs and tax procedures and
instituting whatever other reform measures are suggested. And
then, basically, nothing happens. As I left in June of 2000 an
Agency was offering $10,000,000 to implement the reforms that
had been adopted. Many of those reforms are still not
effective. However, it became clear to me fairly quickly that
something was working because Georgia was not in anarchy nor
was the society destitute. Even though there were not enough
jobs, and public servants including teachers and professors were
not being paid a living wage, Georgians went about their daily
business in a way that indicated a common understanding of the
laws of an economically viable society. Wondering just what
these obviously unwritten laws were led me eventually to the
Vory V Zakoni, the Ramidini or Thieves of the Law.
Georgians today seem to be becoming
disenchanted with their American patrons and do not always
understand that the Americans expect them to do a great deal for
themselves. Their history has been that of responding to
overlords, and picking those overlords carefully. I think they
are beginning to wonder about us and it behooves us to
understand them more thoroughly for all our sakes. One thing we
need to understand more are the Thieves because they have had
such a pervasive influence on Georgian society. Studying the
Thieves of the Law might help us build a rule of law. Even if
there is nothing adequately positive to be salvaged from the
Thieves’ culture, understanding it better might help explain
Georgia in a way that would be useful. Further, the Thieves are
not adequately studied for their role in everyday life. During
the Soviet period, Thieves operated as neighborhood supervisors
and judge-arbitrators. Every neighborhood had its Thief who
never committed a crime himself. There was a senior Thief,
sometimes called a “Thief in a Frame” who had been empowered to
act as an arbitrator or judge. The Thief knew all about the
neighborhood and had connections with other neighborhood
Thieves. If your car was stolen your Thief could find it and
tell you how much you had to pay to get it back (or not pay if
you were connected to the Thief or he owed you a favor)--this is
the example always given to foreigners on initial inquiry. The
Thief could also clear the entryway of your apartment of
homeless squatters whom the police refused to touch. He could
arbitrate business disputes. This service would cost you
something, probably related to the value of the business, but
the result could not be bought and you could count on the Thief
to enforce the decision. Thieves also collected a tax or tribute
from all members of the organization for the general fund or
treasury, usually kept in cash and hidden away. They saw to it
that members of the families of those in prison were cared for
from this fund. Above all, they provided protection, a krysha
(Russian for roof) for businesses. That this concept is still
operative is the media report that current President Mikhail
Saakashvili, when speaking to Italian businessmen in Italy,
said, “Come to Georgia; I will be your krysha!” Current
activities are reputed to include financial advice as well as
physical security.
Almost everyone realizes that history is
extremely important to Georgians. They are proceeding into the
new millennium with their eyes firmly fixed on the 12th
century, the golden age of Georgia. There are also more recent
historical experiences that shape their culture, their character
and their society. Given the long history of Georgia constantly
conquered by one or another neighboring empire, it is
understandable that economic activity outside the law was the
only way to sustain the family. The line between hidden
economic ways of sustaining life under a repressive regime, the
most recent of which even outlawed a market economy and private
property, and crime in the traditional sense became and
continues to be blurred, particularly given the strong duty and
loyalty toward family in Georgia. As in many other cultures,
family responsibility and cohesiveness have held Georgia
together over centuries of foreign rule. The obligation toward
family is still extremely strong. If a family member asks a
favor, even if it is slightly illegal, and you refuse, you will
be shunned, really shunned as in the old Puritan notions, not
only by your family but generally; you will become an outcast in
society. In a society that depends heavily on relationships for
its organization and operation, this can be close to a death
sentence.
In some of its rules or “laws”, the
Thieves in Law parallel the Mafia as Georgia parallels Sicily.
There are differences but much that is similar. Leoluca Orlando
writes that Sicily was always a place to be exploited rather
than governed; always a colony passed from one ruler to another
without even the compensation of a harsh but effective
government.
Georgia is much the same. Overrun by one powerful neighbor after
another, it became the military staging ground for the clash of
empires, Ottoman, Persian, Mongol, and Russian. Georgians
learned not to accumulate property which could be requisitioned
but rather to survive by other means, burying their wine
cisterns and even their houses in the ground. Georgians are very
smart and subtle. They learned how to survive. Russian
literature is full of stories of smuggling in the Caucasus. When
considering Georgia the Land of the Golden Fleece, it is well to
remember that fleece is also a verb. As Peter Nasymth has
written, “in historic times, no matter who won the battle, the
Georgians usually went home with the gold in the caravan.”
As with the Mafia, the Thieves stress
honor, with an especially strict code of conduct and
responsibility. Orlando calls this honor a myth for the Mafia
and perhaps it is also the same for the Thieves who like the
Mafia took over many functions of the state. No wonder that when
the Shevardnadze government took over, like the Sicilians,
it had to resist the Thieves as criminals in order to retake its
own (governmental) power.
An additional factor affecting Georgia is
that most recently it was a part of the Soviet Union where that
great effort was made to destroy the concept of private
property. What was legitimate economic activity in most of the
world was a crime against the state in the USSR, often
punishable by death. Further the Soviets originally viewed law
itself as a capitalism institution, designed primarily to
protect private property, and questionable at best. This again
contributed to the blurring of the line between crime and
politico-economic resistance.
The Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union had no
problem in defining the Thieves as criminal but as they say, it
takes one to know one. The Soviets were happy to use the Thieves
ability to organize a society and enforce its rules as a way of
governing the prison camps. Of course, the Thieves rather
helped this effort by requiring prison time of applicants for
Thief status, probably to reinforce their status as resisters to
the overlords and to establish their authority as enforcers, as
well as to reflect their own life patterns, but they were also
probably influenced by the fact that they considered the
Bolsheviks themselves to be criminals. Of course, Stalin and
many others were Georgians. (They are considered by
criminologists to have been criminals, but not Thieves.) They
adhered to no governing Code like the Thieves did, and, once in
power they made every attempt to eliminate those, such as the
Georgian revolutionary leader Kamo, who knew them to have been
criminal. Further, the communists in pre revolutionary times
were quick to use funds obtained by crime. Revolutionary and
political movements are often funded by crime of one kind or
another that some revolutionaries doubtless do not classify as
crime at all.
Different authors writing in English on
the current criminal influence on economic development in the
former Soviet Union interpret the term Thieves of the Law,
differently. Since the Thieves have a Code obligation not to
discuss their organization, akin to the Sicilian omerta, it is
difficult to get definitive information; although in Georgia,
Thieves are well known and understood in society. Solzhenitsyn
refers extensively to the Thieves in the non-fiction Gulag
books, without ever completely describing or defining them. One
of the most pervasive stories about the origins of the Thieves
is that they were formed in Soviet prison camps when Stalin
threw unprecedented numbers of criminals, intellectuals and
political prisoners together in groups that were uncontrollable
because of their sheer size. The Soviet internal security police
were said to have unofficially supported the Thieves as long as
they kept order in the camps. However there is more than one
point of view on what the story really is.
The Thieves Code prohibits any
cooperation with state or government. This obligation caused a
big split among the Thieves in prison camps during World War II
when they were given the opportunity to serve in the soviet
army, in violation of the Thieves Code. The return of those who
fought to the prison camps caused a major battle called the
bitches’ war that weakened the entire Thieves organization
considerably and created rival groups and factions. In later
years some Thieves proposed that this rule among others be
changed, and that the Thieves move toward being a more
legitimate organization. One leader to take this position was
Jaba Isoliani from Georgia who later served in the Goergian
Parliament, the first Thief to do so openly. However the
Thieves Congress at which this was proposed did not adopt that
suggestion causing more splits and rivalries. One reason to try
to understand the Thieves is that many of the criminal
organizations that seem to be taking over a major part of the
economies of many countries are based on the Thieves, even if
they do not adhere fully to the Code and in fact war with the
Thieves. Many other provisions of the original Code are also
breaking down as the reason for the original Thieves and their
original Soviet prison camp context no longer exists in the
extensive form it once did. For example, it is often no longer
necessary to have served in prison to be a Thief; in some
organizations, coronation can be bought. Originally, Thieves
could not achieve the highest status unless they had been in
prison, were sponsored by existing Thieves served an
apprentice-probationary period supervised by a Thief, and were
voted in or crowned at a Thieves’ meeting where they were given
a new name or nickname. So who and what are they?
Johan Backman in The Inflation of
Crime in Russia argues that the name of the Thieves should
really be Acknowledged Thieves, because “zakoni” does not refer
to law, but to something that is generally “acknowledged” by the
underworld. He thinks “Thieves Professing the Code” is also a
good suggestion, but “acknowledged thief” is better. But he
also discusses the penchant of the Russian police culture of
consciously stigmatizing groups and maintaining lists of
stigmatized groups with detailed files as a method of law
enforcement in a system depending heavily on extra-judicial
discretion. Based on this analysis he asks whether this term,
“has practically nothing to do with the actual underworld, but
is invented and reinforced by the Russian police?” Could it be
possible that the “acknowledged thief” is a pure police term and
one of the stigmas serving the discretion of the Russian police
culture?”
That is, is it a term solely made up by the Soviet Ministry of
Internal Affairs to strengthen their fight against this group by
using a term which meant more or less acknowledged criminal
leader, for purposes of stigmatizing the group and which ignored
any political overtones.
On the other hand, Volkov refers to those
who characterize the “Zakonniks” as lawyers, as “doctors of
informal (unwritten) law.” He contrasts them primarily with the
more modern emergent Russian criminal groups that he calls
bandits. Others may think the bandits are modeled on Thieves
but less constrained by their Code and more able to integrate
into protection of the widest sort and forms of economic
monopoly verging on and becoming totally legal, whatever that
means in current Russian society. He quotes a speech of Putin’s
as indicating that organizations which become totally legal
should not have to worry about the original source of their
capital, (possibly even as the American robber barons?).
However, Federico Varese in
The
Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy
raises the question of whether the Thieves were strictly a
Soviet phenomenon arising in the overcrowded camps of the Stalin
era or a product of pre-revolutionary Russia. He cites
historian Jacques Rossi for the validity of the pre-Soviet
existence of this group. He refers to the legends of the ‘old
noble thieves world’ that tell of the heroics that existed in
Tsarist Russia and cites Santere as an additional source.
Others he cites say the opposite and the whole analysis is
complicated by the fact that soviet analysts tended to label all
crime and criminal organizations as inherited from capitalism.
He says the term Vory-V-Zakoni only first appeared in criminal
documentation and dictionaries in 1955, at the time when some
the Thieves themselves were disappearing as a result of the
bitches war. Another part of this problem is that some analysts
see the Thieves as primarily an organization of convicts within
prisons while others see widespread activity outside prisons.
Varese also refers to historians who have chronicled thieves and
beggars guilds in Russia from the middle of the nineteenth
century onward. In comparing the guilds or arteli he finds the
Thieves much better organized which he concedes may be a result
of the Soviet prison camp system.
While the Thieves’ organization is in
many ways reminiscent of the Sicilian mafia, unlike the Mafia,
it is not strictly hierarchical, but rather distinctly
democratic, or horizontal, or rather disorganized, depending on
your point of view (Georgians tend to concede that they are
disorganized, but also spontaneous). The organizational
structure was more horizontal than vertical although there was
also a clear progression in rank. Varese sees them outside the
prison walls as a coalition of criminal leaders each controlling
a sector but allied with each other.
Caroline Humphrey in The Unmaking of
Soviet Life sees the Thieves as not an illegal network, but
a separate world with distinct groups rather than networks. She
also refers to the arteli and the bratva (fraternity) concepts.
Her argument is that “ the rackets are not only private
suppliers of protection, nor simply ad hoc usurpers of state
functions, but culturally distinctive groupings that use what we
might call techniques of predation and patronage evolved from
historically earlier Soviet contexts.”
Her analysis is extensive and instructive. I would agree that
the analysis of the Thieves requires an acknowledgement of a
different, non-Western, definition of “the state” and definitely
of the “Rule of Law”. Thieves in Georgia may well antedate the
Soviet era. Analyses of their function and meaning need to
recognize that opposition to the national government and its
laws has been for centuries based on the fact that the governing
power in Georgia has not been Georgian. Some Georgian Thieves
have claimed a princely heritage from ataman times. The Soviets
only increased this attitude by making the few activities that
were legal new serious criminal offenses.
Some might say they helped hold the
country together through a time of oppression and anarchy when
private business was a crime and people suffered from economic
deprivation as well as repression. Some allege that the current
widespread internationl government corruption makes it hard to
distinguish between criminals and newly emerging states which
don’t really exist in this part of the world as the West knows
them. Writers on the economic role of criminal organizations
after the fall of Communism stress that at least at the
beginning, the state was just one organization among many with
the potential for achieving order through controlled violence.
The state must provide justice, a workable tax system, and an
enforcement system of controlled violence. The Thieves do all
that.
Some see positive elements in this system
that ran Georgia for at least a century and built on folklore
figures of earlier times like Arsena Odzelashvili whose statute
can be found in Msketa, the ancient capital and spiritual center
of Georgia and who robbed from the rich and gave to the poor.
The Thieves do have laws. Even if they were originally named by
the Soviet Miltia as a means of stigmatization, their code and
the necessity for obeying it certainly became widely known among
the population. The Thieves regime was in a sense an alternate
Rule of Law that was rarely violated since the consequences were
serious to fatal. The Thieves are generally described as brutal,
and they work to maintain that reputation. Nevertheless the
Thieves enforced a legal system known to all and respected by
many. Is it possible to have officially adopted the Thieves
laws? Stephen Handelman of Freedom House has written in an
article that at one point Georgia considered doing just that. He
says, “Some countries, such as Georgia, have contemplated in
effect giving up the battle by legalizing many of the existing
practices of the black market economy.”
If Georgia had done this, it would not be
completely unprecedented. Hernado DeSoto has documented that
the American frontier law called the Homestead Act was not the
result of legislative genius in Washington as was evidently
given out at the time and is still so studied in American
history, but rather a codification of existing frontier
customary property law enforced by squatters’ associations.
Further, even the lower federal courts as well as state
legislatures refused to follow the U.S. Supreme Court decision,
Green v. Biddle, upholding the rights of formal legal title
holders over squatters titles. According to DeSoto, Congressmen
eventually realized that squatters had a lot of votes and passed
the Homestead Act and other legislation protecting the rights of
those operating under squatters’ law. Interestingly, DeSoto
titles one section discussing these issues, “Lawlessness or a
Clash of Legal Systems?” He also writes:
“It took the
politicians some time before they awakened to the fact that
alongside the official law, extralegal social contracts for
property had taken shape and that they constituted an essential
part of the nation’s property rights system. To establish a
comprehensive legal system that could be enforced throughout the
nation, they would have to catch up with the way people were
defining, using and distributing property rights”
The question in DeSoto’s
title seems extremely pertinent to the former USSR and Georgia.
Looking for an answer to that question is one of the purposes of
this work. The capacious American common law system, the life
of which is experience rather than logic according to Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., also gradually encompassed the squatters’
law which included constitutions for claim associations and
attendant rights for members. Although some squatter sanctions
rivaled the Thieves in violence, most gave at least the illusion
of due process.
Harold Berman in his latest
book, Law and Revolution II, in discussing the emergence
of capitalism in 16th century Germany, notes how many
practices codified and systematized then had existed for
centuries. He says that only economic historians have told this
story so far, “yet it is critical also for legal history, since
it reveals that a primary source of contract law in the
sixteenth century was the customary law of merchants and
bankers” The same was true for property law of the time.
While at first glance it might seem a bit of a stretch to relate
the Thieves law to emerging capitalist law in 16th
century German commercial law, it is necessary to remember the
discussions referred to above which points out that the whole
concept of “state” and “law” is different in post Soviet
societies and in Georgia in yet other ways. But as the
foregoing examples indicate, the strength of customary law has
been notable in achieving our current status of Rule of Law; the
strength of the peoples’ law, considerable. And again, the
question is what have the Thieves contributed and what do they
still contribute, good or bad, to the peoples’ law for everyday
life, and now, post-Soviet to the rules of economic activity?
It could also be said that
the society of Thieves has given the Country of Georgia the only
uncorrupted and enforceable judicial system Georgia has ever
known. This is in contrast to many state judicial systems in
the CIS, including Georgia. In Georgia, King Vashtung VI
writing an enormous new legal code in the 18th
century nevertheless privately despaired of there ever being
true justice in Georgia.
Georgi Glonti’s study brings
newly released information and an independent perspective to the
discussion of these issues that pertains not only to Georgia,
but to the entire region, and indeed the world.
From a socio-political
perspective how this quasi-governmental organization is to be
fairly categorized is a difficult question. Is it primarily a
quasi-legal society or a quasi-criminal society so extensive it
developed its own legal system? Is it or was it primarily
political? Most importantly from a social perspective, how has
it operated and how does it operate now? These Thieves speak of
honor. Have they treated their fellow citizens with honor? Has
the Thieves Law supported the day to day economic activity which
allows a society to survive? And have the Thieves of the Law
enabled Georgian families to survive when no other form of
income was available, making all Georgians to some degree a part
of the Thieves Rule?
This last question is an
important one for Georgian society and Georgian self-image.
Many Georgians, when told that an American was looking for the
positive side of the Thieves would say, “Well thank you for
that.” I think that in their deepest hearts Georgians are
ashamed of their cooperation and tolerance of the Thieves but
have found no other way to survive. It is necessary to bring
some of this into the light so Georgians can deal with the truth
of these matters, their part in it, and the need to go forward.
Also, since most Georgians admit to following Thief law more
strictly than governmental law, it behooves reformers to know
what sort of system the Georgians have been used to. Perhaps
the Thieves are more Robin Hood than Mafia, perhaps not. We will
try to contribute some knowledge to this evaluation.
The country of Georgia is
still considered to be a lawless society by many. In 2004 it was
estimated that up to 80% of its economy was still shadow, or
extra-legal. It is often listed as the most corrupt country in a
corrupt region. Elizabeth Pond, writing in the Wall St.
Journal in 2000 commented that the Georgian system was not
corrupt; corruption was the system.
Georgia has never had an opportunity to develop a tradition of
the Rule of Law and as a nation still barely understands the
concept. In the 18th century King Vachktung the VI of
Georgia attempted to identify sources of law which could be used
by Georgia judges (Persian law, canon law, maybe even Armenian
law) and to enact 267 new laws to run the country, but even
after he completed his great work, he wondered if there would
ever be the kind of law which results in justice in Georgia. Law
to Georgians has tended to mean oppression and they are in no
hurry to obey it no matter what the source, whether it is tax
law or keeping their seat belts fastened while taxiing to an
airport terminal.
In 2003 authorities of
Georgia on behalf of the president of Georgia, Eduard
Shevardnadze repeatedly publicly declared that the problem of
the Ramkiani, the “Thieves of the Law” threatened the political
and economic stability of the country. Sessions of parliament
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were repeatedly held to
develop efficient methods to conduct the struggle against
professional criminality. This is particularly interesting
because one of the small junta who helped remove the
democratically elected president, Gamsecurdia, and put
Shevardnadze in office, or whom Shevardnadze used to take power,
was a well known Thief, Jaba Ioseliani, who later became a
professor of theatre and author who was assassinated after the
beginning of Shevardnadze’s campaign against the Thieves.
So how criminal are the Thieves? For a
criminologist, an early question is whether there is a category
of criminals known as professional criminals. Early
criminology research did not distinguish between organized crime
and the criminal professional; there was little analysis of
individual motivation or status. Now, however, there is an
emerging category of professional criminal, one who earns his
living by crime, and this is where most think the Thieves
belong. The Thieves in Law, including their judicial branch, the
Thieves in a Frame, infiltrate every aspect of Georgian life,
control large financial resources participate in organized
crime, have extensive contacts abroad and generally run a tight
ship at home. But, they are currently being superceded by more
“modern” criminal organizations which do not have their
reluctance to cooperate with the state in any form and are able
to combine criminally obtained capital with cooperative state
officials to take a “legitimate” business position. In Russia,
Putin has indicated that the government will only look at
current practices of organizations, not how they originally got
their money. This will allow former criminal organizations to go
legitimate, but although some individual Thieves have abandoned
the organization to become legitimate businessmen the Thieves as
a whole seem committed to non cooperation with state authorities
and dependence on crime for income.
As mentioned above, there is an on-going
debate among criminologists as to the connection or distinction
between professionalism and organization in criminal
activities. The criminal organization is stable and serves
organizational ends, not personal agendas. A criminal
organization is a professional business with clearly understood
offices among its members, well-established connections with law
enforcement and political authorities and so forth.
Criminologists tend to consider organized crime not so much as a
legal concept but as a complex social phenomenon whereas
professional criminology is understood only as a criminal law
concept which does not have sociopolitical characteristics. The
authors of this work disagree with this analysis, since
organized crime cannot be adequately understood without
understanding professional criminals who are an integral part of
criminal organizations. This is also important now that criminal
organizations are moving into legitimate business.
The following excerpt from Georgi Glonti’s
book
, Vory V Zakoni is an illustrative
description of a leading Georgian Thief who operated before and
during the time of transition:
The Best Known
Georgian Thieve
The Georgian Thieves leadership has had many
personalities who exerted a big influence on the development of
criminal society in the USSR and the countries of the CIS. Among
those to be especially noted is a Legend
Jaba Ioseliani,
the actor-academic-politician.
Jaba Ioseliani
was born in 1926. He was arrested for
the first time at sixteen for larceny and soon achieved the
supreme achievement in the criminal world, becoming "a thief of
the law ". It was an unprecedented career at that time because
of his youth. After his second arrest he disappeared from view
and eventually was located in Leningrad. There, he lived under
an assumed name and, without a secondary education, was accepted
by the psychological faculty of the university. Unfortunately,
he studied only four years. At twenty nine he was again arrested
for participation in armed robbery and was sentenced to 25
years. By intervention of national leaders of the USSR theatre
community, Sergo Zakariadze
and Medeas Dzhaparidze, who were
Georgians, his prison term was reduced and, as a consequence,
Ioseliani was
transferred
from Russia to a Georgian
prison colony where he was elected a thieves "curator"
(overseer) of a zone.
Ioseliani
was freed at the age of
forty. He finished evening school and was admitted to the
Theatrical Institute of Tbilisi due to the support of the then
Minister of Finance of Georgia, P. Ananiashvili. Subsequently he
successfully defended his candidate and doctor's dissertations
(The theme of the latter: "Comedy masks of the Georgian
theatre"), taught theater science in the Tbilisi Theatrical
Institute and at the State University, and wrote plays which
were successfully presented at a Theatre given financial support
by Mardzhanishvili.
There are data that for all
these years, the underworld maintained the rank of “the thief of
the law” for Ioseliani. Young thieves learned endurance and the
creative relation to business, by the example of the operation
conducted in the 50’s under Ioseliani’s management
in Moscow. He and his comrades devised
the idea of putting their own cash registers in some consumer
stores, and regularly punched buyer’s cheques for several hours
and then left with the proceeds leaving the shop to fend for
itself. There is evidence that Ioseliani took part in the
all-Union Thieves' Congress
of 1980 at which
questions of changes in the Thieves' Code and participation in
commercial activity were decided which resulted in big changes
in the further development of the criminal community of the USSR
and the CIS.
At the end of the 1980’s to the beginnings of
the 90’s the political stage rightfully claimed this person of
destiny and abilities.
Jaba Ioseliani would
become one of the central state figures of independent Georgia.
Ioseliani
was the first of the
all-Union Thieves who, having been in prison about 25 years was
elected a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia (Parliament)
and the councilor of president E.Shevardnadze from 1992 for
1995.
Ioseliani
debuted in policy in 1989
when during the election of the People's Deputies of the USSR he
held himself out as the authorized representative of the
well-known public figure. Akakija Bakradze. We must recognize a
successful debut: A. Bakradze became a People's Deputy,
probably, because Ioseliani played a role in his success. In the
Soviet society of the time, especially in Georgia, the
implication that a person was involved in the criminal
underworld always was appreciated above all as a mark of courage
and the ability to counter the authorities.
The tragic events of April 9,
1989 in Tbilisi that so painfully affected the destiny of
Georgia and the USSR forced Ioseliani
to make the decision that it was
necessary to create an armed force for the protection of the
interests of the nation. The need for such a force soon
presented itself. In the summer of 1989 the relations between
Georgians and the Azerbaijanians living in the Marneulsk area of
Georgia appeared headed for bloodshed. The memory of the Tbilisi
events was still fresh, and groups of armed Georgian youth
rushed to
Marneulsk to protect their
compatriots. Among them there were both idealists and people
with doubtful pasts. In August about 30 Georgian men who had
participated in the
Maraneulsk events gathered in the
Tbilisi stadium "Dynamo" and named themselves the "Mkhedrioni”
(Cossack)
squad. The idea of voting for
candidates for commander did not arise. The post was offered to
the most authoritative representative, Jaba Ioseliani who
accepted without hesitation.
Ioseliani began
at once
to push forward his
political ends using the Mkhedroni.
Their leitmotif was embodied in the
following declaration: "We do not obey any political forces or
state structures, and we serve the interests of the nation. We
shall participate in interethnic conflicts to protect the peace
of the population ". Actually, during the first stages of civil
war in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the members of the Mkhedrioni
did not noticeably participate in
fighting or marauding. However the rise in Georgia of an
uncontrollable armed force led by such a leader as
Ioseliani frightened everyone,
especially Z. Gamsahurdia who confidently went on to victory in
the general election for president. Ioseliani never hid his
negative relations with Gamsahurdia, especially during the
political process of 1987. The program of action which Ioseliani
supporters aimed at Gamsakurdia
is reflected in a statement of the
time: "To remove this vermin before he has ruined all the
people".
The overall objective of Ioseliani
during this period was to give the
Mekhedrioni official status as a militia or military force. In
September, 1990 some weeks prior to the defeat of the communists
at elections,
Ioseliani succeeded in registering the Mekhedrioni
as a legal person or organization. He was
helped in this task by an old friend, the first vice-president
Sovmina Guram Mgeladze, presently a substantial businessman
controlling a solid share of the gaming industry in Moscow.
The Mekhedrioni achieved the status of
a recognized legal entity for the purpose of acting as rescuers
in cases of natural disasters. That designation allowed
Ioseliani to create legal bases and divisions in different areas
of Georgia.
The
Mkhedrioni was also registered as
public organization without the right of possession of weapons;
however, they kept actively armed and by this time they already
had armored vehicles. These activities were watched closely by
Gamsakurdia
who, after his victory at the
elections, immediately cancelled the registration of the
Mkhedrioni and forbade its
functioning. However he decided that the right opportunity to
dissolve this organization had not yet come. The decree of
President Gorbachev of the USSR “About dissolution of the
illegal armed formations ", made public in the winter of 1990
helped since the possibility of asking for the help of the
Soviet Army thereby appeared. On February, 18, 1991 special
troops called Zakvo conducted operations on seizing illegal
weapons and technical equipment in the territory of a former
Komsomol small town, a suburb of Tbilisi where the central base
of the Mkhedrioni
had been established. The result of
this exercise was a little
injury to men on both sides, and the
arrest of the head of the Mkhedrioni
and his closest lieutenants.
Ioseliani was
charged with “Illegal
storage of Makarov pistols” and thrown into prison.
During this period in prison together with
Jaba Ioseliani there were a leader of
South Ossetia Torez Kulumbegov, chairman of the National
Democratic party of Georgia George Chanturija, and the cameraman
George Haindrava. All of them were recognized by International
Amnesty as prisoners of conscience. While in prison Ioseliani
was put forward as a candidate for the presidential elections.
Having found out about it, Gamsakurdia
hastily convened a session of
parliament and changed the law.
Jaba Ioseliani
well knew how to react
against arbitrary authorities when in prison. He at once
declared a dry hunger-strike and maintained it for forty two
days. Only after much persuasion he accepted a plea from hands
of the Orthodox Patriarch of Georgia, Ilia
II to cease his strike. As with many a
folk hero, the time in prison, became for
Ioseliani the
peak of his popularity.
In December, 1991
Jaba Ioseliani was freed. Six days
earlier demonstrations against president Gamsahurdia had begun
in Tbilisi. The revolt was headed by the head of the National
Guard, Kitovani--the main shock force
for the putsch - but they had such
serious early losses that they ceased storming the presidential
palace. So, the support of Ioseliani
was solicited and he mobilized the
Mkhedrioni
since the majority of members had not
earlier entered the fighting because their leader was in prison.
Two hours after being freed
Ioseliani acting on this request,
notified his forces to mobilize with the words: "All forces: on
overthrow status". Within one day Kitovani’s national guardsmen
received the required reinforcement. (To tell the truth, the
criminal world, while opposing this political dictatorship, did
not forget itself: in a shipment of two hundred Kalashnikov
rifles, only half remained the next
day.).
Word had it that Ioseliani also decided Z.
Gamsahurdia's destiny. Answering the offer of the president of
Armenia, Levon
Тер-Petrosyan to grant asylum to his
Georgian colleague, Ioseliani reportedly agreed thus saving
Gamsahurdia’s life. The Mkhedrioni recorded victory over
Gamsakurdia by a phrase which was probably supreme, in the
annals of political frankness: "In Georgia there came into
authority a known Thief over an unknown sculptor". The explicit
understanding of the measure of
Kitovani’s popularity and political
possibilities made Ioseliani immediately the main supporter of
the return to Georgia of Eduard Shevardnadze. In a conversation
with the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, held
on January, 6, he formulated his position thusly: “Why send in
Hodia on the soccer field if we have Pele?” To the supporters of
Gamsakuria on whom he this very day ordered his troops to open
fire, Ioseliani
addressed another
aphorism: "Building Democracy is more difficult than eating
beans.”.
In his subsequent capacity as vice-president
of the Council on Safety and Defense and as a deputy in
Parliament Ioseliani began to lobby for his power base, the fine
figures of the underworld. Due to the insistence of Ioseliani,
in 1993 an amnesty for prisoners was declared. As a result about
five thousand criminals were released. Ioseliani also precisely
defined the spheres of economic influence between him and
Kitovani: on one side a tribute would be collected for the
Mkhedrioni, on another the national guards grazed. “While I am
alive, dictatorship will not happen " - so Jaba Ioseliani stated
his views which have established his place and position on the
Georgian state. Probably he was right; dictatorship and criminal
power cannot be jointly held. But as it usually happens in politics,
yesterday's thieves and robbers bring with themselves those
customs and rules by which they lived before. So the question of
principle was raised for Georgia: shall we live under Thieves'
Law, or will the fashion for criminal politicians pass?
In 1995 Ioseliani,
with a group of colleagues, was
convicted of the charge of “change to the native land” or
treason and of the organization of an assassination attempt on
President Eduard Shevardnadze as well as the organization of the
assassination of the leader of the National Democratic party,
George Chanturia, the head of the presidential Fund, Soliko
Habejshvili and the chief of a traffic police, George Gulua. A
number of other well known criminals were incriminated also. The
Mkhedrioni were outlawed. In 1998. Ioseliani was sentenced to 11
years of deprivation of liberty, but in 2001 he was released.
Ioseliani
once again became interested
and involved in politics. Shortly before his demise he stated
his intent to participate in parliamentary elections.
In 2003
Jaba Ioseliani died in the central
clinic of the Tbilisi University Medical Institute. He died
after not regaining consciousness after an assault instigated,
some believe, by political opponents. Leading Russian and
European doctors came to treat him, but they appeared to be
powerless. He was buried in the pantheon of Didubisk,
the cemetery for state and public figures of Georgia.
Conclusion
Glonti’s work shows that professional
criminality in territories of the former USSR and in Georgia in
particular has deep roots and is closely connected to
sociopolitical conditions at various historical stages of
development of the society.
The thieves' community has arisen and was
developed in the bowels of the repressive Stalinist system of
the GULAG and was essentially transformed during the period of
the Khrushchev-Breshnev
era. The original organization
characterized, on the one hand, irreconcilable confrontation
with a ruling government, and, on the other, a symbiosis with
camp administration in the business of operation of the camps
and supervision of inmates in penal servitude for the
fulfillment of socialist five year plans.
The modern community of Thieves of the Law
has regenerated itself as mafiosi-like
gangsters of organized crime although it has kept the traditions
of some formal rituals having more symbolical than practical
value. At the same time modern Thieves as leaders of criminal
societies are a terrible force which did, during the
reorganization of the former USSR and the wild capitalism of the
80’s-90’s-and beyond, succeed in getting financial power,
political influence and transnational criminal connections which
make them even more dangerous to the existing nation state or
any social system.
This is an international problem, the
solution to which many believe lies in essentially new
legal approaches including more
perfect and coordinated actions of policemen and financial
systems of the countries of the CIS and of other nations.
The question also persists as to whether the
Thieves have any positive aspect. In “Global Organized Crime in
Latvia” the authors make the following comments:
“From the global view, organized crime as a
transnational anti-social reality is a phenomenon with a
powerful intellectual and material potential. However, on the
other hand, this phenomenon also inspires a few positive
consequences:
·
It is able to initiate
consolidation of countries with different orientations and legal
system;
·
It determines the development
of new legal systems, organizational forms, technologies and
methods intended to control the phenomenon itself, and from a
dialectical aspect, it can encourage the progress society.”
These authors also agree
with Viano’s statement in 1995 that economic revitalization in
the former Soviet areas requires a “genuine social partnership
that embraces all elements of the people in a common economic
task which in turn requires overall fairness, equity in the
distribution of property, income and social services.”
And, they believe this kind of social and economic justice would
also counteract organized crime. Along with many others they
see the necessity of developing national structures to deal with
organized crime, but some commentators on the current
international efforts at nation building are beginning to wonder
if the days of the nation state are numbered. If so, social and
economic justice in those states that remain and survive becomes
increasingly important as do efforts to establish social and
economic justice on a world wide basis.
The Thieves may have had, and do have, more
of a positive influence in Georgia than elsewhere. Today, the
Thieves organization in Georgia has yielded to Georgian family
values and the clan organization which is the basis for much of
social organization. Thieves in Georgia do marry and their
Thieves titles do tend to become hereditary, with sons following
fathers as Thieves. Further, although there is a new anti crime
legislation from the U.S. and Italy and a stronger police force
and some thought that the Thieves are weaker in Georgia, the
perceived failure of the new tax policies of the Saakashvili
government for small businesses has led to an increase in the
shadow economy that will benefit the Thieves. As elsewhere,
Thieves are entering the legitimate business world, and have
perhaps more incentive to do so since their existence is perhaps
historically more political than elsewhere. For these reasons,
understanding the Georgians Thieves better is one way to help
understand the Georgian approach to the Rule of La
Appendix:
The Thieves Code
There were seven basic laws in the
Thieves Code:
1. A thief must be faithful to and support the basic thieves'
idea.
2. A thief is forbidden to have any contact with law-enforcement
agencies.
3. A thief must be fair in all relations with all others, both
to "thieves in the law " and to authorities
4. A thief has a duty to support and define the thieves’
environment, especially for young members.
5. A thief is forbidden the following:
a)
A thief must refuse to cooperate with any power
structures;
b)
A thief must refuse to give evidence in criminal
investigations or to courts of justice;
c)
A thief must refuse to confess to a perfect crime;
d)
A thief must remain silent concerning accomplices and
their presence (for example, dispositions of "raspberry");
e)
A thief must not have property or savings;
f)
A thief may not have a family;
g)
A thief must periodically be imprisoned;
h)
A thief may not carry weapons;
i)
A thief may not be employed under any condition;
j)
A thief must maintain order in his zone of influence by
resolving conflicts and refusing to take sides in quarrels
and fights;
k)
To heat (to adjust procurement) ШИЗО1 and ПКТ2;
l)
A thief must “fill up the thieves' blessing,” i.e.
collect a tribute from all convicted, concluded and other
persons;
m)
A thief must honour his parents (especially his mother);
n)
A thief must not join any parties or associations;
o)
A thief must understand the thieves basic concepts.
p)
A thief must teach correct concepts of life to youths,
and explain them;
q)
A thief must not have a registration (registration);
r)
A thief must be honest in gambling games among thieves;
s)
A thief must have up to six assistants.
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