Abstract
The
article offers a discussion of the two logics that govern the
behavior of organizational actors – the logic of appropriateness
and the logic of expected consequences – by transferring them
into the realm of international relations, in particular, in
explaining the causes and reasoning behind third party military
interventions into the domestic affairs of other states. The
article provides a theoretical novelty of assessing the success
of interventions not by durability of peace as their main aim,
but by actual fulfillment of their interventionary goals
and objective, which shall be considered when discussing the
pros and cons of the two logics. By analyzing the case of the
Russian interventions in Georgian starting from 1992 and ending
with the recent war in South Ossetia in 2008, the author argues
that the likelihood of success of interventions is higher when
the two logics are merged and not separated from each other in
guiding the decision-makers in their actions.
Keywords:
Logic of appropriateness, logic of expected consequences, third
party interventions, Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia.
Introduction
The
last decade of the 20th century and the end of the
Cold War, which shaped the relations within the international
system of states for almost half a century, marked a significant
upsurge in the numbers of ethnic clashes within state
territories. In the words of Alexander George, the post-Cold War
period “has created a new geopolitical environment and has
spawned many new types of internal conflicts. Such internal
conflicts within states… vastly outnumbered the more
conventional types of war between states”.
The
end of the Cold War together with the positive processes of
overall democratization of the world brought forth proliferation
of severe and zero-sum civil wars. At this point, the
ideological identity of conflicting groups was replaced or
layered with religious and/or ethnic ones. More than two-thirds,
or a majority of the post-Cold War intrastate conflicts, were
fought on ethnic grounds.[2]
Intrastate conflicts continue to attract the attention of
foreign countries that are either being directly affected by
civil wars outside their borders, or which themselves influence
the course of events in foreign countries. Domestic actors in
conflicts do not engage in conflicting actions in a vacuum: any
process significant enough to change one particular setting
would inevitably have a “butterfly effect” on its surroundings.
Third party interventions are and, most probably, will continue
to exist as foreign policy tools of domestic dimensions.
The
fundamental quandary of international security affairs is why
some countries intervene in the affairs of other states while
others do not. Even more so, why do the same states intervene in
some cases and take no actions in others with remarkably similar
conditions? More importantly, what thinking should the states be
guided by in order to succeed in interventions? Under what
circumstances should states take actions outside their borders
to reach their own aims and objectives? Answers to these
questions lie in a discussion of intervention outcomes being
contingent upon their agendas as well as on a discourse on the
behavioral patterns of states both at home and internationally.
The
purpose of this article is to unveil the intervention puzzle
through explaining third party interventions by an interplay of
two logics – the logic of appropriateness and the logic of
expected consequences. While the former pertains to normative
behavior of states, domestically and in the international arena,
as a guiding principle of their actions, the latter frames their
deeds by a dictate of ratio. In viewing pro et contra
of the two logics in a specific case of a third party
intervention I will argue that not separation but, rather,
synergy of these logics in decision-making allows states to
achieve the best possible results in their actions and to
succeed in interventions.
I
will start, first, from an overview of existing theoretical
explanations of third party interventions with a claim that
successes and failures of foreign interventions should be judged
by the specific outcomes of their actions cross-referenced with
their intervention goals and objectives, and not by durable
peace, which is currently a widely used indicator for
intervention success. I will then continue with the explanations
of the logic of appropriateness and the logic of
consequentiality to transfer this neo-institutionalist
theorizing into the field of international relations generally,
and foreign interventions in particular. To support my point of
the logics’ synergy I will review two cases of intervention of
the same actor in a single controlled environment – the military
actions of the Russian Federation in the Abkhazian and South
Ossetian conflicts on the territory of Georgia separately in
1992-1994 and in 2008. I will argue that while the first
intervention had not brought many positive results for the
Russian side because it was guided by the logic of
appropriateness only, the second one was highly successful due
to a synergy of the two logics. Finally, I will re-conceptualize
on the findings and will provide my own theoretical premises for
a successful foreign intervention.
Intervention Success – a Measurement Problem
The
success of foreign interventions largely depends on their nature
– whether the interveners are neutral with no vested interests
in conflict outcomes, or biased and supporting one belligerent
out of their own interests. Being neutral does not mean that the
third parties do not engage in warfare with either of the
belligerents – they may so do, sometimes acting as buffers
between the belligerents. However, they do not actively support
any party to the conflict and are not interested in particular
outcomes because it would suit them, but according to Diehl et
al., aim to foster “a solution that meets the interests of the
disputants as well as the international community”.
Neutrality of interveners is also likely to contribute to their
acceptability by the warring parties, which also increases the
likelihood of their success. Bartunek noted this point when
stating that “[a]cceding to third party permits the …
[belligerents] to save face with their constituents as well as
with themselves, since the third party is considered a
respectable and impartial source of proposals.”
Contrary to neutral interveners, biased third parties decide to
intervene on the basis of their own vital national interests
being affected or threatened by the developments in target
countries. With such a stance towards solution of conflicts,
biased interveners may have more chances to succeed since they
have their own stakes in solving the conflict and, therefore,
would “…be willing to use force if necessary, and its military
capabilities must be sufficient to punish whichever side
violates the treaty…”
The negative point here is that such forceful actions in support
of one party to the conflict would be viewed as hostile by the
party or parties against whom such actions are taken. Therefore,
the high acceptability of a neutral intervener, which
contributes to success of interventions in the first case, is
compared here to the degree of vested interests, the costs the
biased intervener is willing to incur and “wholeheartedness” in
achieving its objectives.
Alone or
in coalitions with others, neutral or biased,
states intervene in the affairs of
other states for various reasons.
Countries may have their own vested interests for interventions, or may be
genuinely interested in acting as neutral and impartial arbiters
and to undertake purely peacekeeping responsibilities. Some
interveners are driven by the desire to stop human suffering and
the actions of belligerents that represent a threat to peace and
security to their region or globally. Others want to use
conflicts to pursue their own goals and objectives and to spread
their influence beyond their territories. Some states may be
interested in extending the conflicts by contributing to the
military capabilities of the belligerents, while others may
still want to build peace by preventing bloodshed and assisting
target countries in their post-conflict recovery. In
either of these cases viewing the goals and objectives of
interventions is vital in assessing the degree of success or
failure of their actions.
Current scholarship in foreign interventions seems to neglect
this instrumental approach to evaluating success and mainly
focuses on considering actual and durable peace as an indicator
for third party success. This means that the actions of states
are considered to be successful when peace was reached in a
target country and it lasted for a certain number of years.
Subsequently, if peace was not achieved or lasted for a short
period of time, interventions are considered as unsuccessful.
There is almost a universal view on measuring the success of
third party interventions by the years of peace following the
exit of interveners from the conflict scene. For some it is five
years of settlement stability,
while for others the criterion is more rigid – the “success” of
a conflict resolution is an actual cease-fire agreement between
the sides lasting for a period of at least six months.
This
approach of using durable peace as the main criterion of success
of interventions proves to be inadequate when the matter
concerns the real agendas of interveners and what they indeed
wanted to achieve by intervening. Consideration of years of
peace as the main dependent variable gives us only a partial, if
not a distorted, understanding of the phenomenon of
intervention.
The
wide array of goals and aspirations of third parties, the roles
they play in international and regional arenas, the interactions
they have with other actors, their compositions and the nature
of the conflicting parties brings the same fallibility to
measuring success by lasting peace as blaming the refrigerator
for not being able to play your DVDs. Years of ceasefire as an
indicator of settlement may, of course, be considered an
indicator for success of intervention in cases where conflict
settlement and peace was indeed the aim of interveners. However,
there are conflicts where third parties directed their support
to ethnic groups, which eventually lost their wars, as a result
of which peace was reinstated. Can we still consider such third
parties as successful? There are also interveners not concerned
with resolution of conflicts at all, but rather, want to
exercise their influence over the countries with wars and beyond
by further prolongation of hostilities. Can a lasting peace
still be used as a parameter for their success? Peace may also
be achieved with minimal participation of third parties or even
due to other factors not pertinent to interveners per se, for
instance by the belligerents themselves. Shall such
interventions be regarded as successful?
The
way to solve this measurement problem is to evaluate the success
of third party actions not by years of peace but by actual
fulfillment of their intervention goals. By this new
indicator, interventions can be considered as successful if they
managed to reach their agendas, which would be clear by specific
outcomes of each separate intervention. Similarly, if the
outcomes of interventions were opposite to the goals the third
parties had before and during interventions, then they can be
said to have failed. By assessing the success of interventions
through their real agendas, we would better understand what was
guiding the interveners before taking particular actions, in the
first place, and, more importantly, on the basis of what
reasoning their goals and objective can be considered
particularly successful.
Battle of Two Logics
At some
point states concerned with the conflicts outside their borders
become faced with a dilemma: to intervene or not to intervene,
and the outcomes of their future actions largely depend on their
pre-intervention lines of reasoning, or logics. Notwithstanding
the multiplicity of rationales for state interventions and their
case-specific differences, decisions
of states to intervene are usually related to two issues:
positive cost-and-benefit calculations, and their moral
obligations either towards the belligerents or with a generally
altruistic behavior.
Decision-making deliberations of actors were pioneered by March
and Olsen in their seminal works on neo-institutionalism.
According to them, two logics govern the behavior of actors and
organizations: the logic of expected consequences
and the logic of appropriateness, which are juxtaposed to
each other and used separately to explain the behavior of
institutional actors. When transferred to the realm of
international affairs, these two logics have a similar, if not
increased, role in states’ behavioral patterns.
Under
the logic of expected consequences, states reveal, as argued by
Hicks, an “instrumental behavior – perceived as semiautonomous –
of rational individuals under institutional constraint.”
Decisions are taken as a result of the actors’ rational choice,
which assumes “some model of individual action, often one based
on subjective-expected utility theory.”
A number of preconditions must be present in such a strategy:
the actors should be aware of their own capacities, should see
several options for action, should calculate beforehand the
costs and benefits of moving in every direction and should act
in the way that maximizes their own benefits.
States, similar to organizations, guided by this logic, also
calculate the expected utility from interventions and the
possible losses they could suffer from their interventions. In
the words of Goldmann, weighing expected consequences
“essentially leads us to derive actions from given preferences”
– if states think they
stand to benefit more that they stand to lose, they decide to
intervene. The questions states ask themselves are “What is the
situation we are faced with? What are the available options for
our actions? What benefits would our interventions bring us and
what costs would we incur? How to design our actions that, as we
think, would bring highest benefits and least possible costs?
What consequences would we face if we intervene and if we do not
intervene?”
Interveners, thus, according to Regan, evaluate carefully “… the
cost and benefits of alternative action along with their
estimations of the probability that any action will achieve the
desired outcome.”
Werner also observed the role of rationality in state actions
when stating that third party’s “…decision to intervene… is
often assumed to be based on his value for the target, the
expected costs of war, and his marginal contribution to the
probability of victory.”
In short, if states see that the utility from their actions is
high enough to outweigh the costs they would incur, they decide
to intervene. Similarly, states would refrain from intervening
if the costs from intervention are unacceptably high in
comparison with the benefits they would receive.
The
second logic – of appropriateness – is based on normative
beliefs that make behaviors or actions appropriate under certain
conditions and inappropriate under others. The notion, levels,
categories and types of (in)appropriateness are set by actors
themselves either alone or together, under institutional
settings that would set norms and standards for all their
members. From a neo-institutional prospective, the emphasis is
made, according to Hicks, “…on the orienting or energizing role
of the social – or, at least, of other individuals – rather than
stressing the casual exogeneity of ego.”
States possess their own social identities that guide their
actions in international arena. The logic of appropriateness,
thus, “essentially
leads us to derive actions from given identities”,
which are also - similar to interests in the previous case -
given, fixed and rigid.
Individually, states may act on the basis of their own sense of
appropriateness, which might differ from that of others. States
act jointly, in the words of March and Olsen, “according to the
institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual,
and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable,
natural, right, and good.”
States evaluate the situation in accordance with the norms,
rules, morality and ideational settings they are themselves
governed by. In this respect, Weber et. al. define three factors
behind the logic of appropriateness: “recognition and
classification of the kind of situation encountered, the
identity of the individual making the decision, and the
application of rules or heuristics in guiding behavioral
choice.”
Equipped with the logic of appropriateness, states, according to
March and Olsen, “…seek to fulfill the obligations and duties
encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a membership in a
political community. Rules are followed because they are
perceived to be adequate for the task at hand and to have
normative validity.”
The questions that states
ask themselves when deciding to intervene are “What is the
situation we are faced with? Who are we? Who are other actors?
Does this situation violate the moral principles our society is
based on? What are our obligations towards our own people, those
involved in conflicts and wider community of states? How will
our behavior affect us? Is the intervention appropriate?”
In
essence, states decide to intervene if they view a particular
situation in the target country as a threat to their identities
and a violation of the principles on the basis of which their
own society or “[r]ules and
practices [that] specify what is normal, must be expected, can
be relied upon, and what makes sense in a community.”
Having assessed the
conflicts from the point of view of their own and the collective
moral basis, states take certain actions if they consider that
the situations have exceeded the threshold of ethical and
normative permissibility. They may still intervene even if their
cost-benefit calculus is negative: they would intervene, in the
words of Weinstein, “…regardless of what the particular
situation involved would dictate in light of national interest”.
States would intervene because it is morally unacceptable for
them to do otherwise, and they can do otherwise. Similarly,
states might abstain from intervention in the domestic affairs
of other countries if they believe that the situation is within
the limits of moral and normative acceptability.
The
problem with this separation of two logics in due to two
reasons: difficulty of their unilateral application to the
philosophy of decision-making deliberations of states, and
insufficiency of their independent usage for explaining diverse
behavior of states. Neither of these logics alone fully explains
the whole complex array of situations that states face and the
options available for them. Much in the same line, Finnemore and
Sikkink argued that “Rationality cannot be separated from any
politically significant episode of normative includence or
normative change, just as the normative context conditions any
episode of rational choice. Norms and rationality are thus
intimately connected…”
Hechter and Kanazawa also pointed out the need for the inclusion
of a discourse of values of individual actors in a proper and
more comprehensive understanding of rational choice theorizing.
A
careful merger of the two logics is, thus, required for states
to reach success in fulfilling their intervention agendas. As
excellently noted by Carr, in order to achieve best results,
“Political action must be based on a coordination of morality
and power”.
The intervention case study presented below supports the
argument of increasing likelihood of success that the
inseparability of the two logics would bring to third parties.
Georgia: Conflict Background
The
first Russian interventions in the conflicts in Georgia took
place under the aegis of peacekeeping missions with conflict
resolution mechanisms after the military clashes of the early
1990s between the titular Georgian nation and the Abkhazian and
South Ossetian minorities. Following the period of the Georgian
history known as the “War of Laws” in the late 1980s-beginning
of the 1990s, against a background of chauvinist and denigrating
rhetoric employed by the country’s first President Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, who openly discriminated against all the ethnic
minorities, the domestic security dilemma took a severe turn.
According to Zdravomislov, the situation culminated in a cycle
of mutually aggressive ethnic nationalism where “[i]mperial
components of the Georgian politics towards Abkhazians
stimulated Abkhazian nationalism, which gave an impetus to the
Georgian nationalism.”
Each subsequent step taken by either party to introduce more
freedoms and rights for their respective communities - in
Georgia proper, Abkhazia and South Ossetia - was considered as
lessening the rights of other ethnic groups, and, thus, directly
threatening their identities.
The
conflict in South Ossetia erupted in December 1990 and lasted
for a year and a half, resulting in approximately 3 000 battle
deaths,
complete economic devastation of Samachablo (as the Georgians
call South Ossetia), severance of transport routes connecting
Georgia with Russia through South Ossetia, and the de facto
separation of the region from Georgia. In
June
1992 the new president of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze signed a
cease-fire agreement with Russia as a guarantor of peace and
security, which established a peacekeeping organ in the form of
the Joint Control Commission (JCC), composed of representatives
from Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia and Russia. From its
very birth, the JCC brought forth the phenomenon of the
“credible commitment problem”
and left Georgia in a disadvantageous position in which it was
alone in facing three opposing, potentially unfriendly and not
trustworthy counterparts – Russia, South Ossetia and North
Ossetia.
The
warfare in Abkhazia started soon after the end of military
activities in South Ossetia in 1992. Under the pretext of
protecting the rail cargo transit to Russia from looting,
Georgian troops entered Abkhazia in August 1992 and occupied its
capital, Sokhumi. After receiving considerable assistance from
mercenaries from the Northern Caucasus, the Baltic States,
Cossacks from the southern provinces of Russia, and military aid
and support from the Russian military bases in Abkhazia, the
Abkhazians managed to retake Sokhumi in September 1993.
The
war resulted in the deaths of 20,000
people from both sides and more than 250,000 Georgian IDPs. To
avoid a large-scale confrontation with Russia, Shevardnaze was
forced to sign another ceasefire agreement with Russia in July
1993 and bring the country into the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) to avoid further Russian interference. Under the
agreement a detachment of CIS peacekeeper troops, formed
exclusively by the Russian military, arrived in Abkhazia and
became the guarantors of de facto peace.
The
CIS peacekeepers, together with the JCC, presented a buffer
between the belligerents and with varying degrees of success
managed to cool down the tensions and revanchist aspirations
from all the conflicting parties, for instance in summer 2004
when erratic fighting nearly led to renewed war in South Ossetia
but was averted by Russian shuttle diplomacy.
This
neither-war-nor-peace situation continued in South Ossetia until
summer 2008 when full-scale warfare started, beginning with the
same scenario of sporadic fighting along the borderlines. Firing
culminated at dusk of August 7 as a response to a unilateral
ceasefire declared by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.
Georgian troops, tasked with “restoring constitutional order”
and bringing peace to the whole territory of Georgia, occupied
village after village in South Ossetia, predominantly populated
by ethnic Georgians. By the end of the next day Georgians were
practically in control of the whole territory of South Ossetia.
Even
before the restart of the military clashes, South Ossetian
authorities were seeking Russian military help to protect the
South Ossetian population, a majority of who were Russian
citizens. The assistance was soon provided: the Russian
peacekeepers, which did not participate in the early stages of
combat, received a strong reinforcement in the form of the
Russian 58th Army and volunteers from Northern
Ossetia and other North Caucasian republics of Russia. Russia
entered the conflict scene with a peacemaking agenda of its own
– what Russian President Dmitri Medvedev called “enforcement of
Georgia to peace”.
In
nearly two days the Georgians, suffering heavy losses, were
pushed away from South Ossetia by the Russians. The Russian
military continued its offensive towards Georgia proper, bombing
its military facilities and destroying military airports
adjacent to the conflict territory and beyond. De facto peace
was reinstated on August 12 after a 6-point peace agreement was
signed between Medvedev and Saakashvili under the mediation of
French President Nicolas Sarkozy. As a result of continuous
pressure from the EU, a group of 340 military observers was
deployed in the fall of 2008 to monitor the situation in the
conflict zones.
This
five-day war, according to the South Ossetian sources, brought
the deaths of 1692 people and 1500 more wounded.
The Russian sources give similar figures - 1 600 casualties
among civilian residents of South Ossetia, 74 Russian military
including 11 peacekeepers, and 171 wounded.
In four months Russian casualty estimates changed dramatically –
according to the report of the Investigation Committee of the
General Prosecutor’s Office of Russia issued at the end of
December 2008, 48 Russian military and 162 Ossetian civilians
died as a result of the war.
The Georgian casualties amount to 413 deaths, among which 169
are military personnel and 228 civilian victims.
According to the UNHCR, 192,000Georgian nationals fled from South Ossetia and nearby
Georgian settlements.
The
volatile state in Abkhazia also changed in August 2008, when
military activities resumed in South Ossetia. Abkhazian forces
were in full mobilization along the border during the South
Ossetian fighting and feared no attacks since Georgia was
clearly not in a position to wage wars on two different fronts
simultaneously. Inspired by the victorious advance of the
Russian troops in South Ossetia, Abkhazian forces seized this
window of opportunity and launched a successful attack on the
Georgian troops in the Upper Kodori region, the only part of
Abkhazia previously controlled by Georgia.
Not
long after the secession of hostilities in South Ossetia Russia
legally institutionalized the results of its intervention by
officially recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as new
independent states and members of the international community.
Currently, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are strengthening their
political gains by seeking further military assistance from and
political alliances with Russia, by allowing the establishment
of military bases on their territories and aspiring to join the
Commonwealth of Russia and Belorussia.
A
Synergy of Two Logics
As a
successor to the Soviet Union in many aspects, inheriting its
diplomatic representations, political, economic and cultural
heritage, not only is Russia vitally interested in developments
in the neighboring former Soviet republics, but also strives to
have a say in the politics of former Soviet republics. In this
respect, Russia strongly resembles a former imperial center with
stakes in the domestic policies of its ex-colonies. Parallels
can be drawn from the French behavior after de-colonization of
the 1960s, very vividly described by Prunier. According to him,
France has always considered Africa “le pré carré” (our own
backyard) and viewed itself as “a large hen followed by a docile
brood of little black chicks”
that needed to be taken care of. Unlike France, however, which
has always upheld the interests of the ruling governments in its
former African colonies, in Georgia Russia chose to support
opposition sides.
The
role of Russia in the Georgian conflicts before 2008 was quite
equivocal and less publicized. There was no hard documentary
evidence of any regular Russian troops participating on either
side of the conflicts in Georgia in the early 1990s.
Russia, according to its leadership, kept strictly neutral, but,
as dubious as it may sound, Zverev postulates this Janus-faced
Russian behavior of the early 1990s: “…(although it was in line
with a consistent Russian policy of supplying both sides in a
conflict), at a time when Russian-supplied warplanes were
bombing Georgian-held Sukhumi, other Russian units continued to
supply the Georgian Army.”
Indeed, Abkhazians, South Ossetians and Georgians had large
caches of arms and ammunition for a major confrontation even
before the start of the conflict, and the only place they could
get these arms were the Soviet/Russian military bases located in
Georgia and Abkhazia.
Such
behavior by Russia revealed a very interesting point in its
early foreign policies - being led entirely by the double-sided
logic of appropriateness, without any clear and visible benefits
that it could receive from its actions. By not closing its
borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thus letting
mercenaries from North Caucasus join the conflicts, and also by
supplying arms and having close ties with the post-Gamsakhurdian
Georgian government, Russia considered it appropriate to be
present in Georgian politics by satisfying all the belligerents
alike as much as possible.
On
the one hand, Russia had longstanding brotherly ties with the
Georgian nation, and a history of protecting it from Turkish
influence. Many Georgians were prominent political and military
figures in the Soviet Union throughout its history. Even after
their independence, there had always been good connections
between the “young” Russian military and its Georgian
counterpart.
The
logic of appropriateness evident in Russia’s supporting Abkhazia
and South Ossetia had two parts: letting the Abkhaz and South
Ossetians be defeated by Georgia would place Russia in a very
uneasy, in the best case, position in relation to the nations of
the Northern Caucasus whose kin the Georgian minorities were.
While for South Ossetians Russia represented an “external
homeland”
in the form of North Ossetia, for Abkhazians it acted as a
“surrogate lobby state.”
In the early 1990s Russia itself suffered heavily from
secessionist and ethnic conflicts between its own ethnic
minorities occupying the North Caucasus and predominantly
bordering Georgia (for instance, the wars in Chechnya and the
conflict in North Ossetia). By letting the North Caucasian
“volunteers” help their brethren in Georgia, Russia, therefore
considered it appropriate to redirect its own domestic unrest
and to quench dissatisfaction, thus acquiring in the eyes of its
North Caucasian nations the image of a protector of their kin.
On
the other hand, there was high dissatisfaction and immense
stigma within certain parts of the Russian political and
military establishment who found themselves beyond the hearth of
power after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Many members of
the Russian/ex-Soviet political and military elites blamed
Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (who was Minister of Foreign Affairs
in 1985-1990) for breaking up the Soviet system, and Yeltsin for
supporting them. The conflicts in Georgia, in words of
Zdravomyslov, represented a perfect opportunity for them to gain
their revenge upon “democrat-Shevardnadze, who took an active
part in dissolution of the Soviet Union” and to use Abkhazia and
South Ossetia for the sake of territorial interests of the
“unified and indivisible Mother-Russia within the borders of
1917.”
In
sum, the absence of clear self-interests, and therefore
uncertain benefits, and an oxymoronic wish to be neutral and to
satisfy all parties put Russia in quite an awkward position,
very correctly pointed out by Zverev in the following
description: “Throughout 1992 and 1993, Russia had no single
policy with regard to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. It was not
clear which would best suit Russian interests - to see Georgia
strong and united or weak and dismembered.” Eventually, this vagueness
took the form of a neutral peacekeeping operation directed by
the logic of appropriateness, which molded the faint
“just-to-be-there” interests of Russia into endless, weary and
unsuccessful peacekeeping benefiting no one.
Contrary to that, the second Russian intervention in August 2008
was highly biased and successful and represented a mixture of
the logic of appropriateness with the logic of expected
consequentiality. This time the former appropriateness was
enhanced by a better grounded and legitimized Russian support to
the ethnic kin of North Ossetians in Georgia through protecting
Russian citizens in South Ossetia. In turn, Russia’s military
actions brought it quite evident and beneficial consequences
from the perspective of its pure self-interest.
The
new logic of appropriateness in the Russian actions also had two
components: continuation of ethnic aspect and introduction of a
completely new domestic and international political reasoning.
From the point of view of ethnic linkages, when military actions
became unavoidable in August 2008 in South Ossetia, Russia was
left with no other choice but to protect their kin and
fellow-citizens from the Georgian military advances. Had Russia
remained indifferent to the fate of South Ossetians, such
inaction would have been lethal to its own statehood since it
would have raised aggressive sentiments in North Ossetia against
the Russian state for giving up their brothers and sisters to
Georgians. For Abkhazians, who, unlike Ossetians, are only
distantly related to the Adigi and Apshili ethnic groups of the
Northern Caucasus, and, thus have no direct ethnic kin in
Russia, their military actions in the Kodori Gorge were, in a
way, a by-product of the war in South Ossetia.
In
addition to blood lineage, the phenomenon of an external
homeland after the first conflicts was strengthened by the
provision of Russian citizenship to the overwhelming majority of
the population of the breakaway Georgian regions. This, in a
way, institutionalized Russian claims in protecting the rights
and freedoms of its subjects.
The
logic of appropriateness was also evident in the Russian
behavior on the domestic and international levels. Almost for a
decade after the ascension to power of President Putin, Russia
was concerned with “consolidation of the vertical of power” by
putting strong controls over different regions and societal
groups. From this point of view, Russian intervention in 2008
was more than appropriate in the light of caring for its
citizens as an inherent part of its domestic raison d’être.
Had Russia not intervened, this would have raised domestic
questions about the power of its government, which would have
lost its authority within the eyes of fellow-citizens.
On
the international arena, Russian actions looked also quite
appropriate within the modern foreign policy line it has been
pursuing. The influence of Russia in the Caucasus was directly
linked with its need to secure its southern borders, a need
exacerbated by NATO enlargement, which was considered as a
hostile move in the Russian political and military
establishment. The possible inclusion of former Soviet Republics
– Georgia and Ukraine – into NATO, apart from rendering a severe
emotional blow to former Soviet decision-makers in the Russian
government who would have lost their former “brothers” to the
hostile West, would mean further military threats as NATO would
be positioned on its southern boundary.
Besides, during the decade after the collapse of the USSR Russia
made repeated attempts to reinstate its hegemonic status and to
appear powerful - if not on the world’s stage then, at least,
regionally. Russia strives to compete with the USA in the
military field and the use of force, just as for the USSR,
according to Lebow, the military “…was the only domain in which
it could compete successfully with the United States and
maintain its superpower status.”
Even the public rhetoric of the Russian policy-makers closely
followed that of the USA after 9/11, which, in the Russian case,
had become 8/8/8.
After
its fiasco with blocking Kosovo’s independence, Russia began
vehemently pushing for the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. During the active phase of international recognition of
Kosovo, Russia repeatedly threatened the West with a quid pro
quo reaction and using Kosovo as a precedent for solution of
frozen conflicts in the Caucasus. Intervention in Georgia, thus,
was also appropriate from the general foreign direction of
Russia towards increasing its prestige in the international
arena.
In
sum, the logic of appropriateness reflected in supporting South
Ossetians and Abkhazians by their political recognition provided
the necessary internationalization, which, in the words of
Finnemore and Sikkink, “…reflect[ed] back on a government’s
domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately
on its ability to stay in power”
and further consolidated the Russian society’s normative support
to the domestic and foreign policies of their government.
The
second Russian intervention also marked the appearance of the
logic of expected circumstances in its actions, which accounts
for the role of rational choice and expected utility
calculation. Two relevant factors influenced the decision to
intervene in Georgia: the need to secure its access to the Black
Sea region’s marine transportation capacities and to establish
control over transit of energy resources from the Caspian Sea to
their destination points, thus remaining the major supplier of
energy to Europe and beyond.
After
the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia was left short of sea
connections with the rest of the world. A close look at the
dynamics of the development of the Russian transportation
network provides important contributions to the discussion on
Russian economic interests in the Caucasus, which suffered from
a drastic decline in marine cargo transportation in early 1990s.
Although the figures for nearly all transportation types dropped
during the first years of existence of the Russian Federation,
until 2001 the decrease of the turnover of the marine ports was
the most dramatic.
Having an initial indicator of 112 million tons in 1990, it fell
by 70% by 2001 to 32.2 million tons and further declined to 26.7
million tons in 2007 accounting for only 0.3% of the total
transportation turnover of Russia.
This
fact is explained by the limited and costly marine foreign trade
of Russia, due to the nature of its sea ports, which are located
mainly in the north of the country and only operate for several
months of the year because of severe climatic conditions (such
as Murmansk, Nakhodka, Vladivostok, and Archangelsk). From the
1990s all the former Soviet ports in the Baltic Sea, except for
St. Petersburg, and the Black Sea, except for Novorossiysk,
belonged to the new independent Baltic States, Ukraine and
Georgia. From this point of view, the biggest advantage Abkhazia
would offer Russia, apart from quick connection to the
Mediterranean and beyond, is the all-seasons operability of its
ports - Sokhumi, Gagra, Gudauta, Pitsunda and Ochamchira - due
to its mild subtropical climate. A broader access to the Black
Sea would provide Russia with better shortcuts to major European
and world customers.
Furthermore, all the major Soviet Union summer resorts are now
outside of Russian reach, being shared by Ukraine and Georgia.
Although the majority of the resort facilities in Abkhazia
suffered from the war with Georgia, their reconstruction has
been underway for a number of years with shadow support coming
from Russian businesses. Now, having officially recognized
Abkhazia, Russia will try to legalize its business presence
there and further develop productive capacities and services in
the region for its own benefit.
In
addition to that, Russia can as well use the Black Sea
capacities for strengthening its military presence to the South,
weakened after split of the USSR Black Sea Fleet between Russia
and Ukraine and losing its highly strategic Crimean territories.
The first signs of this are already evident: in January 2009
Russia decided to start building the base for its Black Sea
military fleet in the Abkhazian city of Ochamchira.
Other Abkhazian ports can be also, in principle, used for
military purposes.
In
addition to the transport corridors of Abkhazia, the region was
famous for its natural resources: charcoal, complex ore,
quicksilver, and barium sulfate. Its agricultural production
included wine, essential oils, canning, meat, dairy products and
fisheries, and during the Soviet Union Abkhazia was one of the
main importers of tea, tobacco and citruses to Russia. It also
had two hydro-power plants, which until now remain important
sources of electricity supplies to Georgia proper. These
capacities of Abkhazia, including quite domestic cheap labor,
can also be fully utilized after its independence – a clear sign
for integration of the economy of Abkhazia with that of Russia
was the reconstruction of rail connections with the latter
before the restart of the conflict and usage of Abkhazian
construction materials for the facilities of the Sochi Olympic
Winter Games in 2014.
Contrary to Abkhazia’s advantageous economic state, South
Ossetia’s territory is quite poor from a utilization
perspective. Due to its severe continental climate, the land is
not suitable for large-scale and efficient agricultural
production. Its natural resources are limited to tufa,
construction marble, drywall and stucco, which are not fully
developed yet. There had been no industrialization in the region
during the Soviet times, and the region survived almost
exclusively on the transfers from the centralized Soviet and
regional Georgian budgets. The population of South Ossetia lived
largely on the remittances coming from its gastarbeiters
working in Russia and their kin supporters from North Ossetia.
Another significant source of income, although secretive, was
until recently the illegal transit of goods between Russia and
Georgia, which was uncontrolled by the Georgian authorities.
In
South Ossetia another rational stimulus was guiding Russian
actions – the need to completely secure control over
transportation of the Caspian Sea energy resources to Europe.
The oil and gas deposits of the Caspian are quite significant:
according to the January 2007 Report of the US Energy
Information Administration, the volumes of proven oil reserves
vary from 17 to 49 billion barrels (comparable to those of Qatar
and Libya) and proven gas deposits amount to 232 trillion cubic
feet (comparable to Nigerian gas).
The Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines and
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline, operated by British Petroleum
with strong support from Europe and the US, connected the
Caspian Sea with Europe via Turkey, bypassing Russia. This
increased the dissatisfaction of Russia, which does not want to
be outside of the oil game.
A
competitor of these transit facilities is the Baku-Grozni-Novorossisk
pipeline passing in the North Caucasus through the recent
conflict territory of Chechnya, quite close to North and South
Ossetia. According to some experts, because of the operation of
the pipelines through Georgia Russia loses annually around 10
million tons of oil that would have otherwise been pumped via
its own pipeline: the turnover of the Baku-Supsa pipeline alone
is three times more than its northern counterpart.
Given
the benefits which oil and gas transit provides to the countries
involved, the Caucasus is gradually becoming a battlefield for
energy resource transportation rights, where control over the
pipelines brings even more significant strategic and political
leverage. Indeed, as O’Hara points out, “Who controls the export
routes, controls the oil and gas; who controls the oil and gas,
controls the Heartland”,
the latter being Europe. The power to turn on and off the
pipelines’ valves at will became a matter of increased
competition in the Caucasian and Caspian region and of concern
to the West.
Existence of the hot spots in the Caucasus and the high
susceptibility of pipelines to insurgent attacks caused serious
concern for the owners and lobbyists of the pipelines from the
very beginning of their construction. Renewed hostilities in
Georgia revealed how vulnerable the oil transit is: the BP
leadership decreased twice the volumes of oil passing through
Georgia compared to before the conflict and even shut down its
pipelines in August 2008, resuming it only after hostilities had
ceased. As a result of the war in South Ossetia, and having been
seriously concerned with the fate of its own oil revenues,
Azerbaijan started negotiations with Russia to double the
volumes of oil transit from the Caspian via the northern route.
According to some estimates, the complete transfer of the oil
current to the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline would bring Russia
$1.3 million per month.
Despite being worth rather a small amount, this rerouting
coupled with the transit of other energy resources, would leave
the control over oil flows within the hands of Moscow and nearly
completely out of the reach of the West.
Conclusion
When
separation between the two logics occurs, states suffer from
their related drawbacks: interventions guided entirely by the
logic of appropriateness, and taken on the basis of the specific
identities of interveners, makes it difficult to correctly
anticipate the results such actions would bring in both the long
and short terms. Similarly, when intervening solely on the basis
of self-benefits relevant to the logic of expected
circumstances, states face problems on a much larger scale,
especially when their actions infringe the moral laws and
normative standards of the society they are part of. When
combined, however, the two logics complement each other and have
the propensity of bringing the best results to states.
The
“hat of appropriateness” would help the intervener to find
justifiable excuses for its actions, both domestically and
internationally. At home, this logic helps interventions look
more legitimate and moral which would lessen the power of local
veto-players to block their country’s foreign actions and
decrease the opposition of other states it would otherwise face.
This is especially true in relation to the casualties that
interveners incur – they have to justify to their
fellow-citizens that the death of their family members in the
armed forces would serve the highest common (at least on the
domestic scale) good.
Through appealing to a higher international authority, as well
as norms and moral principles shared by the majority of states,
the logic of appropriateness brings in the “…require[d] …stamp
of institutional legitimacy upon which long-term measures
depend”
by internationalizing the legitimacy of intervention outcomes.
Indeed, as Fenwick noted, “[w]hat would be arbitrary for the
individual state would in the case of the whole body of states
be no more than the exercise of the higher right of the
community to maintain law and order and to see to the observance
by separate states of their obligations as members of the
community”
The
“hat of expected consequences”, on the other hand, would assure
clarity of interveners’ agendas and result-oriented actions. It
would make the interveners more determined in pursuit of their
high stakes at high costs, since, as state governments
undertaking interventions, they are at all times accountable to
domestic constituencies and taxpayers. The logic of expected
consequences would make interveners act more “wholeheartedly” to
achieve best results since they would see the benefits their
actions would bring them.
As
with the logic of appropriateness, it will also help give good
reasons for the deaths of fellow-countrymen by the benefits
their deaths would bring each and every living citizen.
Similarly, if the benefits are not high enough or vague to
justify expenses, this logic would prevent otherwise costly and
unnecessary interventions, responsible for the loss of human
lives and damage to a country’s international prestige and
domestic standing of the intervener’s government.