Abstract
The policy of ukrupnenie (“merging”), which combines
multiple federal subjects of the Russian Federation into
unified, enlarged political-territorial units, is the latest
phase in the Kremlin’s bid to restore central authority over
its internal periphery. To date, this policy has reduced the
number of Russia’s regions from 89 to 83, and more mergers
are slated for the future. Vladimir Putin, along with the
Russophone press, states that ukrupnenie is intended to
reduce the severe interregional socio-economic inequalities
in Russia by linking poorer regions to wealthier neighbors.
This article refutes this stated rationale. In the process
of analyzing mergers that have already taken place and those
that are planned for the future, it is asserted that
ukrupnenie in fact should be viewed as part of Moscow’s
nationality policy, in turn a de facto continuation of
Soviet nationality policy.
Keywords:
Russia’s federalism, merging, ukrupnenie,
political-territorial units, Moscow’s nationality policy
Introduction
The latest phase in Moscow’s campaign to restore central
authority over its regions is the policy of ukrupnenie
(“merging”), which amalgamates multiple federal subjects
into unified, enlarged political-territorial units. Since late
2005, a series of five mergers has reduced the number of federal
subjects from 89 to 83, quite some distance from the ultimate
goal of 40 or 50.
Russian President-cum-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin insists that
the purpose of ukrupnenie is to “solve social-economic
problems” in impoverished regions by linking them to wealthier
neighbors, in the process slashing resource-draining regional
bureaucracies.
The Muscovite press echoes this justification, asking who
is “next in line for merging?”
and how “many subjects does the federation need?”
Glaringly absent from the discussion is a critical why?
The aim of this contribution is to redress this missing why
with the assertion that any discussion concerning
system-wide change to Russia’s political-territorial structure
tout court should include a consideration of its
nationality policy. It would be remiss to suggest that
Russophone observers ignore the connection between ethnicity and
center-region politics. Indeed, it is frequently claimed that
the Kremlin’s current regional policies are crafted in response
to the political-territorial chaos of the 1990s, a period when
many of Russia’s ethnic republics operated virtually
independently of the federal center.
Missing from these analyses however, is the recognition that the
present grappling over federalism, and the role which
nationality plays in shaping its future, is not merely a
Putin-era answer to the Yeltsin-era “parade of sovereignties,”
the devolution of power which, in the process of creating major
regional wealth disparities, challenged the territorial
integrity of the federation. Rather, as I contend, the merging
of regions should be seen as a continuation of a much
longer-standing nationality policy.
Setting the Stage
A cursory overview of Russia’s political-territorial structure
is necessary. The Russian Federation is comprised of a hierarchy
of units that can be separated into two basic categories:
ethnically-defined republics and autonomous okrugs, and
non-ethnic oblasts and krais (see the map in the
appendix). The former are designated as the historic homelands
of non-Russian titular populations, bestowing important national
minorities with certain privileges.
The latter, inhabited almost exclusively by ethnic Russians,
traditionally have enjoyed no special status.
This ethnicity-infused federal structure is a Soviet legacy. The
Bolsheviks granted the country’s most important national
minorities autonomous republics, which, while
distinguishing them from the fifteen union republics
(i.e. the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Belarus, etc.), were
created to give Russia’s minorities a veneer of statehood that
papered over strict political, economic, and cultural
centralization.
With the demise of the USSR, however, the more powerful ethnic
republics and autonomous okrugs used their accoutrements
of statehood to leverage varying degrees of de facto autonomy
from a weakened center. In short, the federation Putin inherited
was a system of extreme “economic, ethnic, and territorial
asymmetries.”
The policy of merging regions is only the most recent in a
string of decisive moves made by Moscow since 2000 to reassert
central primacy over its internal periphery. The first was the
creation of seven federal districts, each headed by a
Kremlin-appointed representative to oversee the harmonization of
regional laws with federal constitutional norms. In the process,
many functions previously carried out by regional institutions,
such as tax collection, statistical data gathering, certain
court procedures, etc., were taken over by federal agencies. In
2008, it was estimated that “the ratio of federal to regional
powers over regional policy became roughly 70 percent to 30
percent,” a figure roughly inverse to what it was prior to
Putin’s ascent to the Russian presidency.
Following the Beslan school hostage crisis in September 2004, a
tragedy resulting in the deaths of more than 300 people, Putin
canceled popular elections of regional governors and republic
presidents, decreeing that thenceforth all regional heads must
be approved by the Kremlin. Unable to appeal to their
constituencies, governors suddenly became more amenable to the
merging of their regions with neighboring subjects.
It should be noted that, judging by the referendums which have
preceded the political-territorial mergers, affected populations
generally have responded favorably to ukrupnenie. In each
of the completed referendums, significant majorities have
approved of plans to join up with neighboring subjects. However,
as in Russia-wide parliamentary and presidential elections,
campaigns preceding the referendums on merging should not be
considered fair and open. State-controlled media, along with
other governmental resources, were mobilized to drive home the
message that the merging of regions would lead to greater
economic performance; countervailing opinions were excluded from
the discussion. This vision of economic prosperity was repeated
by regional governors who had gained the Kremlin’s favor,
including Krasnoyarsk Governor Aleksandr Khloponin, who said the
merging of his region with two neighboring autonomous oblasts
would lead to a “new industrialization of Siberia.”
Evaluating Putin-Era Regional Reforms
What can one make of Putin’s territorial-political reforms? If,
as the Kremlin has repeated, the primary aim of the reforms
indeed was to improve the economic performance of poorer regions
vis-à-vis wealthier regions, they can be considered an
unequivocal failure. According to the 2007 United Nations Human
Development Report, regional inequalities in the Russian
Federation have grown, not subsided, under Putin’s watch.
The Russian Ministry of Regional Development itself reports that
the industrial output of the top ten regions outpaced that of
the bottom ten by 33.5 times in 2006, a ratio that increased to
39.1 the following year.
The widening gap, according to several observers, is
attributable to the functionary replacement of regional
bureaucracies by federal cadres who, though empowered with
significant central subsidies, are unresponsive to the actual
needs of local citizenry.
Such explanations of growing regional inequality are likely to
be accurate. However, they are posited on the error of taking
Moscow’s declared aim at face value. If the main goal in fact
were to improve the socio-economic status of the country’s
neediest areas, then one reasonably would expect the policy of
ukrupnenie to be guided foremost by the principle of
urgency, defined by population size (the larger, the more
urgent) and relative poverty. Following these criteria, at the
head of the line would be the oblasts of the central and
northwest federal districts suffering from the effects of
prolonged deindustrialization, the poverty-stricken Muslim
republics of the North Caucasus, and the poorest ethnic enclaves
of the Middle Volga Basin, such as Mari El and Mordovia.
However, to date none of these regions has been merged, and none
is slated for merging in the immediate future.
Analyzing Completed Mergers
A brief examination of regional mergers already accomplished
indicates that a rationale based on ethnicity, not primarily on
socio-economic concerns, underpins the policy. In each case, one
or two ethnically-defined autonomous okrugs were merged
into one or two non-autonomous neighbors, resulting in a single,
larger oblast or krai (see Table 1).
Table 1
|
Referendum Date |
Merger Date |
Merging Subjects |
New Merged Subject |
|
December 7, 2003 |
December 1, 2005 |
Perm
Oblast + Komi-Permyak Autonomous Oblast |
Perm
Krai |
|
April 17, 2005 |
January 1, 2007 |
Krasnoyarsk
Krai + Evenk Autonomous Oblast + Taymyr Autonomous
Oblast |
Krasnoyarsk
Krai |
|
October 23, 2005 |
July 1, 2007 |
Kamchatka Oblast + Koryak Autonomous Oblast |
Kamchatka Krai |
|
April 16, 2006 |
January 1, 2008 |
Irkutsk
Oblast + Ust-Orda Autonomous Oblast |
Irkutsk
Oblast |
|
March 11, 2007 |
March 1, 2008 |
Chita
Oblast + Agin-Buryat Autonomous Oblast |
Zabaykal Krai |
Source:
Generated by the author
Erased from the resulting subjects is any indication that an
area within them previously was considered a historic homeland
of a non-Russian nationality. Whereas indigenous populations
formed outright majorities in two of the previously autonomous
regions (Komi-Permyak Autonomous Oblast and Agin-Buryat
Autonomous Oblast), and more than a quarter of the population in
another two (Koryak Autonomous Oblast and Ust-Orda Buryat
Autonomous Oblast), they form small, nearly insignificant
minorities in the resultant mergers (see Table 2).
Table 2
|
Merged Krai/Oblast |
Assimilated Nationality |
Autonomous Population |
Merged Population |
Autonomous Percentage |
Merged Percentage |
|
Perm
Krai |
Komi-Permyaki |
80,327 |
183,832 |
59.0% |
6.2% |
|
Krasnoyarsk
Krai |
Nentsy |
3,054 |
6,254 |
7.6% |
0.2% |
|
Kamchatka Krai |
Koryaks |
6,710 |
14,038 |
26.7% |
3.7% |
|
Irkutsk
Oblast |
Buryats |
53,649 |
134,214 |
39.6% |
4.9% |
|
Zabaykal Krai |
Buryats |
45,149 |
115,606 |
62.5% |
9.4% |
Source:
Generated by the author
Stated rationale is further undermined when considering economic
situations of the pre-amalgamated subjects. Taking comparative
capital investment figures as an indicator, it is seen that only
in two instances did formerly autonomous regions merge with
(only marginally) wealthier oblasts or krais (see
Table 3).
Table 3
|
Merged Subject |
Pre-Merged
Subjects |
2005 Per Capita Capital Investment
(Rank Among All Federal Subjects) |
|
Perm
Krai |
Perm
Oblast
Komi-Permyaki Autonomous Okrug |
30
54 |
|
Krasnoyark Krai |
Krasnoyarsk
Krai
Evenk Autonomous Okrug
Taymyr Autonomous Okrug |
39
7
8 |
|
Kamchatka Krai |
Kamchatka Oblast
Koryak Autonomous Oblast |
50
28 |
|
Irkutsk
Oblast |
Irkutsk
Oblast
Ust-Orda Autonomous Oblast |
58
87 |
|
Zabaykal Krai |
Chita
Oblast
Agin-Buryat Autonomous Oblast |
48
38 |
Source:
Generated by the author
In the case of the formation of Krasnoyarsk Krai, resource-rich
Evenk and Taymyr autonomous okrugs were subsumed by a
significantly poorer – albeit geographically larger – subject,
in the process forfeiting formal recognition of their cultural
distinctiveness. Future mergers will immediately result in the
disappearance of remaining autonomous okrugs,
but also discussed are eventual mergers to erase ethnic
republics, first of all the impoverished republics of Buryatia,
Altai, Adygea, and Ingushetia. It can be assumed that after the
economically laggard ethnic republics have been erased, the
policy of ukrupnenie will be targeted at the more
prosperous among them.
Conclusion
Discussing the merging of ethnic autonomies, Boris Makarenko, a
Kremlin-associated pundit, contends that this regional policy
will “logically correct … historical accidents,”
i.e. the Soviet-era formation of minority homelands within the
greater Russian expanse. The more fundamental accident, however,
is viewing ukrupnenie as a correction to history when in
fact it should be seen as a continuation of Soviet nationality
policy. As cultural-political geographer Ronald Wixman
effectively argued more than two decades ago, Soviet-era
nationality policy had as its primary goal “the maintenance of
the territorial integrity of the USSR and the political power of
the Soviet state.”
Whenever that integrity was threatened, the Soviet regime would
grant temporary freedoms to its minority groups, but as soon as
that threat dissipated, those privileges were revoked.
This same basic principle guides post-Soviet nationality policy.
Much as Lenin granted territorial autonomy within the
USSR to certain non-Russian nationalities as a strategy to
reconstruct the Tsarist Empire, so too Yeltsin ceded
unprecedented freedoms to ethnic autonomies to keep them from
exiting the Russian Federation. Once they had established firm
control over the Soviet territory, Stalin and his successors
rescinded prior freedoms as they carried out de facto
Russification schemes. And it is from this historical vantage
point that the policy of ukrupnenie should be viewed. As
ethnic autonomies are merged into larger oblasts and
krais, so too are minority ethnic groups merged into a
vaster ethnic-Russian nation.